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ABSTRACT
Peru's Shining Path revolutionary movement is at a crossroads. With the September
1992 capture of its founder Abimael Guzman and much of its Central Committee, the
movement that appeared so strong has now been decapitated. Given this, it is tempting
to dismiss the Shining Path as a significant threat to Peru's current order. This thesis
contends that it is too early to close the book on the Shining Path as a long-term threat.
While no one can as yet accurately assess the Shining Path's future, the most important
determinant of the Shining Path's fate will be its ability to contain the damage of Guzman's
capture by adapting to a new state of affairs. This thesis analyzes the organization's record
of flexibility and appeal by examining the ideology, strategy, and tactics employed through
the course of its 12 year war. The thesis concludes that the organization, while
uncompromising at the ideological level, has demonstrated an exceptional degree of
flexibility at the tactical level. This flexibility will be essential if the organization is to
regroup and continue its assault. While the outcome is uncertain this soon after Guzman's
capture, the Shining Path's demonstrated capacity to adapt to diverse circumstances
suggests that the organization has the capability, after a period of reconsolidation, to renew
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In September 1992, in a stunning victory for the
government of Peru, Shining Path founder Abimael Guzman was
captured in Lima. This represents a severe setback for the
guerrilla movement, for not only has it lost its ideological
and spiritual leader, but the raid also captured several
members of the organization's Central Committee as well. The
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) , in the face of these losses,
will have to reconstitute its operations and leadership in
Lima if it is to remain a force in Lima and a serious
contender for power.
What is the future of the Shining Path? While no one can
know the definitive answer, this thesis argues that Guzman's
capture could result in any one of three scenarios. First,
the capture could galvanize the movement into intense short-
term violence as retribution for the capture, after which it
would enter long-term decay and internal conflict, decapitated
by the loss of its overall strategist and unifying force.
Second, the Shining Path, being a cohesive, tightly organized,
and strongly disciplined organization, may proceed as it had
prior to Guzman's capture, only with greater caution and
additional attention to security. Finally, Sendero could go
into short-term hibernation as it regenerates its leadership,
reorganizes its structure, and rethinks its security and other
VII
arrangements in Lima, only to reemerge as a credible threat.
Which of these options proves correct is still unknown,
but the Shining Path's ability to move forward will depend
upon its ability to adapt to a post-Guzman era. If the
organization is flexible and adaptable, it may be able to
weather this crisis. If the organization proves unable to
adapt it is unlikely to respond successfully.
The focus of this thesis, then, is an examination of the
Shining Path's ideology, strategy, and tactics to determine if
the organization has a record of flexibility in the conception
and prosecution of its war on the State. This thesis contends
that the Shining Path has demonstrated a high degree of
flexibility in its campaign. Ideologically, the organization
has proven intransigent, but its use of differing strategies
and tactics in fulfilling the goals of that ideology have been
quite flexible. At the strategic level the organization
established an urban campaign in order to undermine and
ultimately overthrow the current order. At the tactical
level, the organization has employed a spectrum of
inducements, both persuasive and coercive, to assert control
or gain influence over targets. The employment of these
inducements is dependent upon many factors, including the
organization's objectives, its reception in the targeted
community, and the exploitable conditions present in that
community. In short, the movement does not approach targets
with a rigid, preconceived, ideologically determined approach
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to recruitment. The organization's recruitment strategies are
determined by its assessment of the vulnerabilities of the
community and often include tactics that conflict with its
rigid ideology.
The thesis also examines the organization's appeal in
Peruvian society, finding that it appeals to or has the
potential to appeal to several constituencies that cross class
lines. The organization's ability to appeal to women, youth,
and university students demonstrates not only flexibility in
its message, but that the movement is not just a campaign that
appeals to the poor of society.
Finally, the thesis examines Peru's vulnerabilities to
revolution and its vulnerabilities to the Shining Path in
particular. The thesis concludes that the State has done
little to address its own vulnerabilities to the Shining Path,
thereby facilitating the group's regeneration. Until the
State addresses fundamental issues about society and its own
inability to assert authority in the countryside, it will
remain vulnerable to the Shining Path.
The thesis concludes that given the group's capability to
adapt its tactics and message to targeted communities, the
most likely response to Guzman's capture will be to retract,
regroup, and ultimately continue its guerrilla campaign.
Further, the thesis determines that the State has done little




Peru's return to democracy in May 1980 was accompanied by
the emergence of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, or SL)
,
which at the time appeared to be a fringe terrorist group in
the Andean highlands. Despite an apparently anachronistic
revolutionary ideology out of place both in Latin America and
in a democratic state, the Shining Path's organizational
skills, strategy, tactics, and message created an environment
that compelled President Alberto Fujimori, on April 5, 1992,
to suspend democracy to allow for a total campaign against the
organization. This autogolpe was instituted despite the fact
that, at the time, over two-thirds of Peru was already under
an emergency rule that gave local army commanders authority
over all government activities." The Shining Path had grown
in size, scope, and importance to such a point that no analyst
of Peru or revolutionary movements could dismiss its chance
for success in gaining control of the State. Indeed, some
analysts had begun to warn of a Shining Path threat to Peru's
neighbors
.
] See James Brooke, "Peru's Military Is Granted Broad Powers in
Rebel War," New York Times, 3 Dec 91.
A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF GUZMAN'S CAPTURE
In mid-September 1992, in a stunning victory for the
government, Shining Path founder and leader Abimael Guzman
Reynoso was captured in Lima. This governmental victory
represents a severe setback for the Shining Path, for not only
has its undisputed leader been captured, but so has much of
its Central Committee. The momentum of the conflict, for the
first time, seems in the government's favor. Sendero will, in
the face of this blow and the now-obvious skills of Peru's
Counterterrorist Directorate (DINCOTE) in Lima, have to in
some way reconstitute its operations and leadership in the
city if it is to remain a force in Lima and a serious
contender for power.
What is the future of the Shining Path? While no one can
know the definitive answer, this thesis argues that Guzman's
capture could result in any one of three scenarios. First,
the capture could galvanize the movement into intense short-
term violence as retribution for the capture, after which it
would enter long-term decay and internal conflict, decapitated
by the loss of its overall strategist and unifying force.
Second, the Shining Path, being a cohesive, tightly organized,
and strongly disciplined organization, may proceed as it had
prior to Guzman's capture, only with greater caution and
additional attention to security. Finally, Sendero could go
into short-term hibernation as it regenerates its leadership,
reorganizes its structure, and rethinks its security and other
arrangements in Lima, only to reemerge as a credible threat.
The first scenario (ultimate failure) is certainly a
possibility, especially given that much of the Central
Committee, including the leader of the Lima Metropolitan
Committee, Laura Zambrano Padilla, was captured along with
Guzman. Deprived of several strategic planners and leaders,
but possessing considerable firepower, the Shining Path could
still wreak much destruction on society. However, now robbed
of its visionary leader, the organization could, while
inflicting pain on Peru, persist without posing much danger to
the State and the existing order. The situation in Peru could
evolve and become similar to Colombia's relationship with its
revolutionaries, where society lives with much violence but
whose State is not seriously threatened.
One could posit several reasons why the above scenario is
not likely to occur. The Shining Path has been, since its
inception, a disciplined, patient movement that acts based on
its own timetable. Sendero has consistently dictated the
scope and pace of the war, forcing the government into a
reactive posture. Despite the loss of Guzman and others,
there is no reason to believe that the organization, at least
at the militant or activist level, has lost its discipline.
The second option (no effect) is highly unlikely, for it
is difficult to believe that any revolutionary organization
could sustain such a setback without effect on its strategy,
tactics, or operations. Guzman is much more than just SL's
leader; he is also its spiritual sage. After years of
cultivating an image of genius, his capture will have a
psychological effect beyond decisions on strategy. Remaining
Shining Path leaders are likely to either be in deep hiding or
otherwise laying low; such a posture is even less conducive to
aggressive guerrilla action than "normal" underground
activities . J Further, uncertainty about the startling success
of DINCOTE will probably, especially in Lima, keep SL leaders
from exposing themselves unnecessarily.
However improbable this option, it should not be
completely dismissed. The Shining Path is a formidable
movement whose organizational strength greatly contributed to
its almost uninterrupted rise in power from 1980 to mid-1992.
Utilizing what most in Latin America would call an ideology
alien to Latin America, and commencing its operations in
concert with Peru's return to democratic rule, Sendero has
long confounded the experts. The Shining Path has
demonstrated, through its long string of successes, that to
underestimate it is to grant openings which the organization
all too often effectively exploits. Again, however, this
scenario is unlikely, given the challenge now facing SL's
organizational cohesion and operational flexibility.
: For an analysis of the difficulties inherent in normal
underground activities, see J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary
Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground," Terrorism
and Political Violence Vol . 2, No. 2 (Summer 1990): 193-211.
In the third scenario, Sendero goes into hiding or a
short-term standdown to regenerate itself. This does not mean
that all operations will cease, as they are undertaken at low
organizational levels. However, any significant shift in
tactics, strategy, or direction would likely be postponed, as
the organization has many challenges to face in light of
Guzman's apprehension. Thus, at least in the short-term, the
danger of a Sendero victory would be greatly diminished.
Sendero 's first order of business would be to make
Guzman's (and the captured Central Committee members')
knowledge obsolete to prevent the government from capitalizing
on any information derived from interrogation and to limit its
own vulnerability. Given the level of the individuals
involved, this could take considerable time and effort.
Second, the organization would have to ensure that it has a
cham-of -command that is understood and respected by all
senior leaders. A power struggle would obviously be
counterproductive to the movement, causing organizational
paralysis and perhaps exposing itself further to DINCOTE.
OTHER ISSUES
Which of these scenarios unfolds will not be known for
some time, but several factors will be influential in
determining the final outcome. The Shining Path did not
blossom suddenly, but slowly and methodically built its bases
of support, its organizational structure, and its coercive
capabilities. It is thus not likely to expire suddenly
either. Further, Sendero has in the past reduced or
stabilized its profile, such as in 1984 and 1985, only to
spark an upsurge of activity later, such as in 1988. :
SL has absorbed the loss of key leaders in the past
without disintegrating. Guzman's capture is far more
significant than the loss of other Sendero leaders such as
Osman Morote Barrionuevo (captured in June 1988) , Antonio Diaz
Martinez (arrested in 1983 and killed in June 1986), and Luis
Kawata (status unknown, but expelled from the organization),
but the organization has lost leaders before only to
regenerate and continue its campaign. Further, Guzman was
aware of the government's intense manhunt, given previous
close calls. This, when combined with his poor health, makes
it likely that planning for his capture or death had occurred
prior to September 1992. 4 This resiliency when faced with
high level losses indicates, as Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano
writes, that "... Sendero leadership is by no means limited to
a few individuals, but is rather the concerted effort of a
well-oiled organizational structure in which trained, capable
individuals are continuously accessible."
'See Gordon H. McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities: The
Urban Campaign of the Shining Path, R-4150 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand,
1992) , chapter 3
.
4Although the simultaneous capture of Zambrano and Elena
Albertma Iparraguirre may have complicated those plans.
Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat
of Narcoterrorism (New York: Praeger and The Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 1990), 74.
Another factor to consider is that little has changed in
Peru proper. Clearly, the solid police work demonstrated by
DINCOTE is evidence of a greater capacity to combat the
insurgency, but that greater capacity has only been
demonstrated in Lima, and Lima is but one of the insurgency's
four distinct campaigns and one its of six regional
committees . "J Losses or setbacks in the Lima Metropolitan
Committee do not affect operations or leadership in the other
regional committees. Until Peruvian forces can stop Sendero
in the countryside, losses in Lima may not be debilitating.
As previously stated, Sendero normally dictates the pace
of the war. The government's poor record of acting
preemptively against the movement means that, regardless of
the impact of Guzman's capture, the organization can take as
much time as it deems necessary to heal itself. Unless
DINCOTE and the military in the countryside can follow this
success with aggressive pressure on the organization, Sendero
will have the opportunity to, as it has in the past, choose
the timing of its actions. The government, now holding the
initiative, would not want not surrender it to Sendero, a
likely event unless the government's intelligence capability
is able to follow the organizational and operational changes
likely to be made by the Shining Path.
Guzman's apprehension arguably puts as much pressure on
6McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities, 14. Tarazona-
Sevillano, 57
.
President Fujimori and the military as it does on the Shining
Path. The capture has, in the short-term, given the
government a much needed boost; however, if unable to build on
the capture and dramatically reduce the level of violence in
Lima and the countryside, Fujimori risks falling into a deeper
political and security crisis than before the capture. His
own constituency will expect to see tangible results from the
capture of Guzman. If unable to deliver a greater measure of
security, Fujimori could fall into illegitimacy, unable to
provide a marked improvement following a spectacular but thus
far operationally limited success. If Sendero proves capable
of absorbing this loss and continuing its campaign, Fujimori
could well be left in a more untenable position than before
the arrest
.
Finally, Guzman's apprehension does nothing to address the
conditions that spawned and supported the movement in the
first place. Until long-standing social and economic
conditions are addressed, the foundations from which the
Shining Path emerged will remain for the organization, with or
without Guzman, to employ to further its cause.
B. CAN SENDERO OVERCOME THE LOSS OF GUZMAN?
Regardless of one's speculation on the future of SL, it
undeniably faces a very difficult path that will challenge the
capabilities of the organization and remaining leaders. A
response to the current situation will demand an organization
with an enormous capacity for adapting itself to new and
different situations. Will Sendero be able to adapt? As
stated above, no one can know for certain at this juncture,
for, despite previous losses, none were as significant as
Guzman's loss. SL's ability to adapt will determine its
success or failure in surviving Guzman's apprehension. One
way to assess Sendero 's potential for recovery is through the
analysis of Sendero 's past. Does the Shining Path have a
history of flexibility? An analysis of Sendero 's past is not
analogous to the current situation, but it is the only non-
speculative option available.
This thesis will thus address the issue of Sendero 's
flexibility. Despite its initial depiction as an inflexible,
dogmatic organization too closely wedded to an alien ideology
not suited for Peru, this thesis will demonstrate that the
Shining Path has proven, at the operational level, to be a
remarkably flexible organization able to adapt and succeed in
diverse settings. Chapter II examines the Shining Path at the
ideological, strategic, and tactical levels to demonstrate
that SL, while ideologically intractable, is quite versatile
at the strategic and tactical levels, both in form and
content. Sendero' s flexibility is demonstrated by its ability
to alter its strategic orientation and the tactical use of
various persuasive and coercive instruments to convert a
targeted audience to its cause. These instruments are used
differentially, with emphasis, mix, and type of instruments
dependent upon the local context. Sendero has shown itself
capable of making local concerns the focus of its recruitment
tactics, while molding local needs to its own purpose. At the
local level, SL deals with "bread and butter" issues, and such
issues change, however subtly, at" each village or shantytown.
As Chapter II will show, the organization has demonstrated its
skill at fitting its overall mission into the needs of a local
populace, thus going beyond the infliction of pain and into
building bases of support from which it contends for power.
Related to Sendero ' s capacity to gain support through
various inducements is the ability to appeal to a variety of
popular constituencies. If a revolutionary group is the
equivalent of a single issue candidate, it can inflict pain,
but is unlikely to become a credible threat to the established
order. The Shining Path has been characterized, variously, as
an Indian or, more recently, :is a peasant movement. However,
Chapter III will make the case that Sendero has shown the
flexibility to appeal across classes, which, if true, is
further evidence of a highly flexible organization, one with
the potential to overcome the loss of its leader.
C. VULNERABILITY TO REVOLUTION
After establishing the Shining Path's adaptability and
flexibility, this thesis will attempt to establish a framework
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through which one can examine Peru's vulnerability to
revolution, and more particularly, its vulnerability to a
revolutionary movement such as the Shining Path. The framework
established in Chapter IV will identify those aspects of
Peruvian society exploited by the Shining Path, concentrating
on three general themes: (1) the divided nature of Peruvian
society; (2) the environment of economic crisis which has
allowed the organization to flourish; and (3) the status (or
lack thereof) of governmental institutions that could or
should act either as a barrier to the rise of a revolutionary
group or serve as a countervailing force to inhibit the growth
of such an organization.
The above themes will be explored because they are the
conditrons that allowed the Shining Path to emerge initially,
and are the conditions that allowed it to reach its recent
level of strength. If these conditions are addressed and
adequately rectified, the Shining Path will not succeed, with
or without Guzman.
At this juncture it is simply too early to predict the
impact of Guzman's seizure. However, the Shining Path has
been underestimated too often in the past, and one would be
more prudent to "hope for the best and prepare for the worst . "
Despite Guzman's capture, rt is far too early to write
Sendero's obituary.
11
II. RIGID IDEOLOGUES AND FLEXIBLE TACTICIANS
The Shining Path is normally portrayed as having a rigid,
inflexible ideology, which, if true, should limit its ability
to adapt to conditions in other countries. This chapter will
demonstrate that Sendero ideology, while rigid in an
overarching way, has not bound or restricted Sendero in its
pursuit of seizing control of Peru. Despite its rigid
ideology, Sendero has been extremely skillful in altering its
strategies, tactics, and message to suit particular
situations, playing upon the vulnerabilities, anger, or needs
of its targeted audience, as well as its own larger strategic
requirements. Thus this chapter's title-- the Shining Path is
an organization with an unbending ideology, yet it has not
allowed that ideology to limit its strategies or tactics in
pursuit of its overall goal-- the overthrow of Peru's existing
political, social, and economic system.
To make this point, this thesis will review the
foundations of the Shining Path's ideology, focusing on the
marriage of Mao Zedong, Jose Carlos Mariategui , and Abimael
Guzman that makes SL unique. Then the paper will examine how
the Shining Path operationalizes its ideology, studying the
messages and tactics used for gaining support. This will be
done by documenting and analyzing the inducements, both
persuasive and coercive, used to mobilize a targeted
12
population. In particular, this chapter will, using case
studies, analyze how SL differentially applies these
inducements in Peru's two distinct cultures to gain support
and to otherwise advance its own strategic agenda. First, I
will focus on the message and tactics used in the interior,
examining two distinctly different highland cultures. Within
this section the essay will address Sendero methods used with
the peasants of the southern highlands, and then its methods
with the coca farmers in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Secondly,
the Shining Path's methods in urban areas and the surrounding
shantytowns will be analyzed. This chapter will demonstrate
that despite its seemingly rigid ideology, Sendero has been
flexible enough to sell itself to a diverse spectrum of
Peruvian society, adapting its approach and mix of inducements
to each situation, showing an operational flexibility that
will be demanded if the organization is to survive Guzman's
capture
.
A. SHINING PATH IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY
Jose Carlos Mariategui and Mao Zedong are the ideological
foundations of the Shining Path.' While Mariategui and Mao
are from opposite sides of the world, they share many common
7Clearly, Marx and Lenin are also foundations of Sendero'
s
ideological thought, as evidenced in Guzman's claim to be the
"Fourth Sword." Guzman stated that "We would never be able to
understand Maoism without understanding Marxism-Leninism. " Guzman
interview, 4-5. However, Guzman views Mao as the most applicable
to Peru; thus, only Mao's ideology will be reviewed in this paper.
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characteristics, both in background, ideology, and methods
espoused to implement their preferred solutions. Each was the
first to carry out a Marxist study of their respective
countries, and each was important in the founding of his
country's Communist Party. Each saw land tenure inequities as
a fundamental detriment to progress, and each looked to
peasant -based revolution as the solution. 3
Mariategui's Marxist interpretation of Peru, written in
his Seven Essays, was an attempt to develop a revolutionary
program for Peru.' The kind of society Mariategui envisioned
was one founded on the values and institutions of the Incan
civilization of the 1500s and would, by extension, be
dominated by the indigenous population. 1 ' Mariategui's ideal
would be " Inca Communism," a system based on the Incan
societal structure with a modern socialist economic system. 11
In his essays, Mariategui illustrates a Peru dominated by the
conquering whites of Europe, exploiting the Indian from their
'Andrew Wheat, "Shining Path's Fourth Sword Ideology," Journal
of Political and Military Sociology Vol. 18 (Summer 1990): 45.
'Jose Carlos Mariategui, Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian
Reality (Austin, TX : University of Texas Press, 1971).
; John M. Baines, Revolution in Peru: Mariategui and the Myth
(University of Alabama Press, 1972), 80.
:iTarazona-Sevillano, Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of
Narcoterrorism, 15 and 17.
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artificial capital of Lima. This world view, written in 1928,
is essentially the same one used by Sendero today.'"
While Mariategui provides the rationale and Peruvian
version of communism, Mao provides the method, through his
concept of a protracted, rural, peasant-based revolutionary
struggle. As Wheat writes, Sendero rarely deviates from the
Maoist line. For instance, Wheat quotes Mao's proposal for a
"new democratic state," ruled by the four revolutionary
classes (peasants, proletariats, and the petty and nationalist
bourgeoisie)
.
1: Although many writers have called Sendero an
Indian movement, or, more recently, a peasant movement, Guzman
states that the masses he serves are much broader:
It is the masses of our people, the proletariat, ... to
which we owe our existence and which we serve; our
peasantry, mainly the poor peasants; the
intellectuals; the petty bourgeoisie; the advanced;
the revolutionaries, those who want a radical
transformation, in a word, a revolution- that's who
sustains the Party.- 4
Later, when questioned of his views on property rights,
Guzman states that
Mao stressed this slogan again and again, which for us
means the destruction of semifeudal property and the
distribution of the land as property to the peasantry,
!
"Wheat writes that the Shining Path "applies Maoism to a
memory of Peru - one analyzed by Mariategui 60 years ago. It has
not updated Mariategui to the present day..." Wheat, 48.
ljWheat, 43.
14 Interview with Chairman Gonzalo, conducted by Luis Arce Borja
and Janet Talavera, El Diario, 24 Jul 88, translated by the
Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (hereafter, CSRP)
(Berkeley: CSRP, 1991), 29. Hereafter, Guzman interview.
15
mainly the poor peasantry... As for the national, or
middle bourgeoisie, the policy is to respect their
rights . . . 1?
These are not isolated examples of Sendero following the
Maoist line; the Guzman interview reads like a primer not only
for Mao's strategy of revolutionary peasant warfare, but also
of Mao's plans for Chinese society. Even Sendero 's five
revolutionary phases are modeled on Mao's three-phased theory
of protracted revolutionary warfare. 10
The Shining Path's revolutionary ideology, although based
on Maoism, is in reality much harsher than the revolutionary
ideology pursued by Mao in the 1940s. Mao appealed to a wider
spectrum of Chinese society, and tried to build as broad a
popular base as possible. Sendero, on the other hand, has
been far more exclusive in reaching out to society, having
been deeply affected by the reforms initiated by Deng-Xiaoping
following Mao's death. Thus, as Wheat writes, Sendero is much
closer to the Mao of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of
Four than the Mao that came to power in 1949. l
Mao is clearly the dominant influence of Sendero ideology
and tactics, but Mao's dictums are not followed blindly and
verbatim; this is where the Guiding Thought, or Gonzalo
Thought becomes important . Gonzalo Thought is the synthesis
• Guzman interview, 75.
•'Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru
R-3781 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, Mar 1990), 15.
''"Wheat, 47 and 50.
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of Mariategui and Mao into an ideology and plan of action
applicable to present day Peru. Tarazona-Sevillano writes
that the major philosophical contributions of Guzman are the
synthesis of the laws of dialectics, and the formulation of
the five phases of armed struggle. 1 ''
Guzman has altered Sendero's plans more significantly than
Tarazona-Sevillano has suggested. For example, the Shining
Path formulated a revolutionary plan to confront a
predominantly urban society by taking the battle into the
cities, a factor that Mao did not have to face. 1 '
Additionally, as a part of the urban campaign, SL has
attempted to infiltrate established and legitimate groups such
as unions and trade groups, and established front
organizations ("generated organizations" in Sendero parlance)
such as the Association of Democratic Lawyers, which had
previously been despised and condemned.- As Guzman states,
'Tarazona-Sevillano, 20. The five phases are: (1) Agitation
and propaganda; (2) Sabotage; (3) Generalization of the struggle;
(4) Conquest and expansion of the support base and the
strengthening of the guerrilla army; (5) General civil war, siege
of the cities, and collapse of the state. McCormick, The Shining
Path and the Future of Peru, 15.
:
'For a discussion of the ideological shift that took place
within the Shining Path as it developed its urban strategy, see
McCormick, "Sendero's Approach to the Cities," From the Sierra to
the Cities, 5-19.
- FBIS-LAT-91-178, 13 Sep 1991, 35, citing La Republica, 1 Sep
1991. The article's specific example is of Sendero's growing
influence in SUTEP, the Trade Union of Education Workers.
McCormick writes of Sendero's disinterest in front organizations
prior to 1985 or 1986 and subsequent change of policy in The
Shining Path, 27-28.
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"The first thing that we established was the need to avoid a
mechanical application of people's war..."- : Guzman and the
Shining Path, while firmly following the path blazed by Mao,
have not been afraid to deviate from Mao's programs when
necessary. Close observation of Sendero's ideology and
strategy shows that although they are generally rigid in
following established doctrine, the Shining Path has clearly
demonstrated the strategic flexibility to adjust to changing
conditions, and dispels the notion of an unbending Sendero
unable to adapt.
B. OPERATIONAL IZING IDEOLOGY
As the case studies of Sendero recruitment will show, SL
uses a wide variety of methods of gaining influence and
support from targeted populations. These methods vary
depending upon the needs and vulnerabilities of the community,
as well as the organization's requirements, and can encompass
a myriad of approaches. Sendero's approach to recruitment can
be best understood by categorizing the particular aspects of
recruitment under the general heading of inducements . That is
to say, SL chooses its methods, messages, and tactics from an
;Guzman interview, 4;
arsenal of what this paper will call persuasive and coercive
inducements . --
By persuasive inducements this paper means providing (or
promising) goods, or what Wickham-Crowley calls collective
benefits, to a targeted population, whether they be tangible
or psychological. This can encompass benefits provided in a
positive sense, such as something provided _tp_ the targeted
populace, or benefits provided in a negative sense, which
provide the targeted audience the capacity to strike out or
gain retribution or revenge against a perceived enemy.
Coercive inducements, or what Stephen Walt calls negative
sanctions, are the repercussions a target may incur by not
supporting the revolution, or more seriously, by actively
supporting the State.- This paper will now address each of
these categories of inducements in turn.
--The concept of inducements is not new in addressing guerrilla
or revolutionary methods of recruitment, as it is drawn in part
from the collective-goods theory, and is similar in approach to
Parsons' four types of social control. See Talcott Parsons,
"Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry
Eckstein, ed . , Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964) . Also see Nathan Leites and
Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority : An Analytic Essay on
Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970),
33 and Chapters 4 and 6. More recent theory by Timothy P. Wickham-
Crowley has yielded what he calls "macrosocial exchange processes."
Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution (Armonk, MY: M.E.
Sharpe, 1991) , 17
.
-'Stephen M. Walt, "Revolution and War," World Politics Vol.




A persuasive issue exploited by the Shining Path is
what Barrington Moore, expanding on Rousseau's concept, termed
the social contract, or mutual obligations that link rulers to
the ruled. According to Moore, the authorities are obligated
to: (1) provide for the defense of the populace from foreign
enemies; (2) maintain internal peace and order; and (3)
contribute to the material security of the populace. In
return, the populace is expected to: obey orders that:
contribute to the ruler's fulfillment of his end of the social
contract; contribute toward the common defense; surrender a
portion of its excess to the State; and arrange its own social
relations in such a way as to maintain the internal peace." 4
If the State fails to fulfill its obligations within the
contract, it loses legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects,
and, if that loss of legitimacy is extreme, the region




' Chalmers Johnson makes a
- 4Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice : The Social Bases of
Obedience and Revolt (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1978), 20-22.
Moore and Rousseau are only two of many social theorists who have
written about some form of a social contract. Thomas Hobbes, for
instance, wrote of covenants, and John Locke wrote of authority as
a complementary relationship that incurred rights and obligations
on both the ruled and the rulers.
-
rWickham-Crowley , Exploring Revolution, 34-35. By virgin soil
Wickham-Crowley means that a political actor does not have to
"reeducate" a person or region in revolutionary ideology, but only
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related point when he asserts that a State loses legitimacy
when its only claim to authority rests on the monopoly of
force, meaning, by extension, that the State has mortgaged its
legitimacy by not fulfilling its responsibilities under the
social contract:
When confidence has evaporated to the extent that the
exercise of power is futile, when the authority of the
status holders entrusted with supervision and command
rests only on their monopoly of force, and when there
is no foreseeable prospect of a processual change in
this situation, revolution is at hand . -"
As if confirming Johnson's point, the Peruvian
government is viewed in much of the country as more of an
abuser of power than as a party under contract. Peru's human
rights violations are legendary, and the army's
countennsurgency campaign tends to be indiscriminate in its
violence.- This delegitimizes the coercive arms, and by
extension, the State as a whole, resulting in the fear and
to educate them; essentially, the revolution only needs to write on
a blank slate, not first erase that slate.
- Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1982), 33. Rather than speak of a
social contract, Johnson would say that societal values and the
division of labor are in disequilibrium, and the ruling elite is
not enacting policies to bring society back into equilibrium.
-
7Mauceri writes that the army's approach to the insurgency
closely resembles the national security doctrines followed by
Southern Cone militaries in the post-World War II era. He further
reports that the number of civilian casualties increased almost 10
times in the year after the military assumed control of the
counterinsurgency campaign. Philip Mauceri, "Military Politics and
Counter-Insurgency in Peru, " Journal of Interamerican Studies and
World Affairs Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter 1991): 91-92.
21
suspicion with which much of Peruvian society views the State,
a suspicion used by the Shining Path to their advantage.
The government, further, is not fulfilling its end
of the social contract. It has been unable to protect its
citizens from Shining Path violence, thus failing the second
of its obligations under the social contract. Furthermore,
the government has not been able to contribute to the material
security of the populace either, as crushing inflation, job
and income losses, and negative economic growth have been
constant since the early 1980s.-'
The Shining Path, on the other hand, has been able
to fulfill aspects of the social contract in certain limited
situations. In the Upper Huallaga Valley, Sendero provides
protection from government troops and the Colombian cartels,
and negotiates prices for coca leaf, fulfilling all of the
requirements of the basic social contract. "Sendero law,"
known as "people's justice" and administered by "people's
committees," satisfies the need for civil order in areas
controlled by the organization.-'' Finally, Sendero-mandated
J8As Bernard Aronson stated, "When President Fujimori took
office, Peru's 1990 GDP was down 22 percent from only two years
before. It would take Peru 12 straight years of five percent
growth to get per capita income back to 1987 levels." Assistant
Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs Bernard W. Aronson,
testimony before the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, March
12, 1992. Peru's economic condition will be addressed in greater
detail in a later chapter.
-'See, for instance, James Brooke, "Marxist Revolt Grows Strong
In the Shantytowns of Peru," New York Times, 11 Nov 91.
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price controls and killings of merchants believed by peasants
to be engaged in price gouging constitute a blunt and crude
form of combatting monopoly power and inflation, and is seen
in the highlands as enhancing material well-being.
With respect to the social contract, the Shining
Path, as an outside organization contesting for power, has an
advantage over the government in that the government, as the
central authority, is expected to uphold its obligations,
while Sendero, as a nongovernmental challenger, is not
generally held to the same standards. The Shining Path, as a
group not in power, can always claim that it will better
fulfill the needs of the people, even in cases where it is
unable to do so now. In this respect, the government as the
incumbent is forced to contest for people's support on the
basis of its record, a record that is, for most Peruvians, a
dismal failure. As in any political contest, the incumbent,
if running with a record of failure, is at a certain
disadvantage. The challenger, on the other hand, can contest
the race based on the hope and promise for a different and
better future.
Jb. Socioeconomic Issues
Socioeconomic conditions provide Sendero with a
variety of messages with which it can appeal to a large
segment of the Peruvian population. An important element of
the Shining Path's message that carries a powerful appeal in
23
Peru is the promise of land. The Shining Path has long
understood its importance, and regularly appeals to the
peasant desire for land. Despite the success of the land
reform programs of the Velasco years (Peru's reformist
military president from 1968-1972), land tenure in Peru
remains highly unequal, as the vast majority of the population
did not benefit from his land reform programs. Much of the
expropriated land was not redistributed to the local Indian
communities, but rather to the former tenants of the seized
haciendas, which were later turned into cooperatives. 31
Thus, land tenure remains highly skewed. 5 - In Bases for
Discussion, the Shining Path speaks of "The peasants being the
primary force, especially the poor peasants, struggle for the
armed conquest of land under the leadership of the Communist
'356,276 families, or 24 percent of rural families benefitted
from land reform programs. Cynthia McClmtock, Peasant
Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981), 61.
i! Daniel M. Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin
America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1991), 254.
-76.3 percent of all landowners (1,084,364 total owners) own
6.6 percent of total agricultural land, while .1 percent of the
landowners (2,187 total owners) own 61.7 percent of the
agricultural land. James W. Wilkie, Enrique C. Ochoa, and David E.
Lorey, eds . Statistical Abstract of Latin America (hereafter,
SALA) , Volume 28 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center
Publications, 1990) , table 302, p. 44-45. Further, in 1961, prior
to Velasco 's land reforms, the average farm size was 1.3 hectares;
in 1972, the average was 1.4. SALA Vol. 28, table 304, p. 49.
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Party." Additionally, to remind of its long history of
fighting for land rights for peasants, Bases for Discussion
alludes to Guzman's support of the poor peasants in Ayacucho
before the beginning of Sendero's war against the State in
1980. "He (Guzman) supported the land invasions, held peasant
events..." 4 Guzman was more specific in his appeal to land,
stating "... which for us means the destruction of semifeudal
property and the distribution of the land as property to the
peasantry, mainly the poor peasantry...."''
The Shining Path's also utilizes the hopelessness
of its target's current situation, in conjunction with the
offer of material security inherent in the basic social
contract. Perhaps Sendero's best recruiting tool has been the
extreme and prolonged economic downturn that has plagued Peru
since at least 1987. Since that time, real wages and
employment have fallen precipitously, and economic growth has
been negative. ' Such hardships play into SL's hands, as it
"Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru (CC/PCP) , "Bases
for Discussion. The PCP Calls on the Masses to Struggle for Power.
The Thinking of Gonzalo and the Workers," (hereafter, Bases for
Discussion) Sept 1987, Reprinted in Latin America and Caribbean
Contemporary Record (hereafter, LACCR) , Vol. VII 1987-88 (New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1990), C322.
J4 lbid.
, C324 and C325.
^Guzman interview, 75.
"Real wages fell 15.8 percent in 1988 and 46.3 percent in
1989. GDP fell 7.9 percent in 1988 and 11.3 percent in 1989.
Carlos E. Paredes and Jeffrey D. Sachs, eds
.
, Peru's Path to
Recovery (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), table
2-1, p. 85.
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can promise a better life-- without having to offer much
proof
.
The inequalities that pervade Peru offer another
avenue of persuasion through which it can recruit. These
inequalities can be along racial lines, where the disparities
between the Indian, mestizo, and white sectors are stark;
class lines, with Peru's highly unequal distribution of
income; or gender lines, where women face discrimination
and exploitation. Sendero offers a means for each of these
groups to lash out and take back from a society which has, in
their view, treated them unfairly.
c. Psychological Needs
Although not as concrete as the above-mentioned
inducements, psychological needs such as a sense of belonging,
self-esteem, personal importance, and an explanation and
solution to problems are important goods SL delivers to its
followers, particularly the poor, landless, and dispossessed.
These are the very groups that, until the rise of the Shining
Path, did not have a voice in society. The Shining Path
preaches that their lives have worth, something they may not
have previously felt. Sendero writes, quoting Guzman,
37In 1986 the top 10 percent of Peru's population controlled
35.4 percent of total income, while the bottom 70 percent
controlled 36.9 percent. Paul Glewwe, "The Distribution of Welfare
in Peru in 1985-1986," Living Standards Measurement Study working
paper 42 (Washington, DC: The World Bank), cited by A. Javier
Hamann and Carlos E. Paredes, "Economic Characteristics and
Trends," in Paredes and Sachs, eds . , 54.
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Poverty is a driving force in the revolution. The
poor are the most revolutionary, poverty is the most
beautiful song... Poverty is not a blemish, it is an
honor. :i
El Diario echoes a similar theme as it plays up the sense of
equality in the People's Guerrilla Army (PGA) . In El Diario,
Sendero writes that
Among the soldiers of the PGA, neither physical traits
nor skin color count. There are mestizos, whites,
blacks, Asians, men and women of all ages, . . .
Everybody looks after one another.
This concept is significant given the degree of prejudice and
discrimination prevalent in Peru. Sendero provides an
atmosphere of belonging, a sense of purpose and worth that is
not conveyed to or felt by the marginalized of Peruvian
political or civil society.
Finally, the Shining Path, through its ideology and
message, provides the certainty of a "scientific"
understanding of society, what is wrong with that society, and
how to fix it. Carlos Degregori writes that Andean people
have long been deceived by rulers who maintained a monopoly
over education. Thus, the people, the "children of the
deceived," are searching for, among other things, the truth.
In the universities (and primary and secondary schools as
well) Guzman and the Shining Path provide a simplified and
:y
"Bases for Discussion," C320.
V
~'E1 Diario Internacional , Aug-Sep 1991, 10
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accessible version of the only "scientific truth." 1 As
Chalmers Johnson writes,
When an ideology is developed enough to be a full-
blown revolutionary ideology, it will combine the
ideas of "goal," "instrument," and "value." It will
supply intellectually and emotionally satisfying
explanations of what is wrong with the old order and
who is preventing its change, how to remove the
obstacles to change, and what to replace the old order
with.'''1
This relieves the stresses of everyday life, such as racism,
sexism, poverty, and joblessness, because the Fourth Sword has
given them the answers to their situation-- and promises to
change that situation.
d. Conflictive Situations
Sendero's most basic and all encompassing method of
persuading targeted audiences into supporting the revolution
is through its exploitation of the particular conflictive
situations that exist in targeted regions or villages. 4_
Sendero's method is to gather intelligence on its target and
determine its conflictive situations, or those aspects of life
that most anger or bother the targeted audience. These
situations can run the gamut of corrupt public officials,
hoarding by the local agricultural cooperative managers, price
4uCarlos Ivan Degregori, "A Dwarf Star," NACLA Report on the
Americas Vol. 24, No. 4 (December /January 1990/1991): 15-16.
"'"Johnson, 86-87
.
4JThe term "conflictive situations" is taken from a Francisco
Reyes report printed in La Republica, 31 Jul and 1 Aug 1991, cited
in FBIS-LAT-91-156, 13 Aug 1991, 42.
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gouging by local merchants, misconduct by the local priest,
and so on. With this information in hand, Sendero "resolves"
the conflict by punishing or killing offenders or offering
them up for public trials, while extolling the virtues of
Sendero. Thus by dealing with the village's local concerns
and allowing them to gain some measure of revenge or "justice"
from those who have "wronged" the community, Sendero offers a
vehicle for addressing problems. Simultaneously, the Shining
Path channels public discontent into its revolutionary program
by linking the goals or demands (the conflictive situations)
of the targeted group with the party's objectives. 4 ' This
linkage, entirely dependent upon the local situation, can
range from demands for land to revenge against a neighboring
village to demands for food or electricity. Addressing these
situations, in each case unique to its targeted region, allows
the audience to vent its anger and frustration, while allowing
the Shining Path to further recruit for its cause.
2. Coercive Inducements
These inducements are used if persuasion fails to
convince a targeted audience to join the Sendero cause. This
is not to say that just because they are inducements of last
resort that they are used infrequently; clearly the brutality
of Sendero ' s revolutionary warfare and the flight from the
countryside by highland peasants reflects that persuasion is
'McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities, 11
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not always successful. But it is important to recognize that
coercion is but one weapon in SL's arsenal of tactics, and in
fact is just another option along the spectrum of available
tactics. As Thomas Perry Thornton writes, the use of terror
on the part of revolutionary groups aspiring to power is but
a different expression of persuasion, with the same ultimate
goal-- to influence political behavior. 44 Leites and Wolf
echo the linkage (and often the mixing) between persuasion and
coercion, writing
In practice, both persuasion and coercion are
important as well as intimately linked. Severe
coercion is often combined with a considerable and
effective persuasive effort by Rebellions
.
4r
a. Violence and the Threat of Violence
Thornton writes that terror, in the context of an
internal war, is a method used by insurgents to break or
disrupt the "inertial relationship" between the existing State
and the masses
.
In order to do this (break or disrupt the inertial
relationship) , the insurgents must break the tie that
binds the mass to the incumbents within the society,
and they must remove the structural supports that give
the society its strength... This process is one of
44Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political
Agitation," in Harry Eckstein, ed . , Internal War: Problems and
Approaches , 7 2-73.
4r
'Leites and Wolf, 33.
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disorientation, the most characteristic use of
terror . . . 4l
Thornton's description of the use of revolutionary
terror closely mirrors Sendero's use of terror. Sendero
attempts to break a targeted community's ties to the
government; then, if persuasion of local power brokers is
unsuccessful, terror is used to disorient a society and bring
it into Sendero's sphere. Examples of this abound, from the
intimidation or killing of government officials to the attacks
on prominent individuals that resist recruitment . Once it
succeeds in inducing disorientation, SL can then begin to
create the community it wants, to oppose the government and
support the war against the State. 4
Shining Path violence, as all revolutionary
violence, is aimed at several audiences. The first audience
is the unfortunate individual or individuals who, by virtue of
position or action, incur Sendero's wrath. That, however, is
the least of any revolution's objective; the real audience is
the living. Sendero's use of terror against the living is
intended to have one or more effects, including: (1) to break
the relationship with the State by demonstrating the State's
4 Tbid., 74.
47Thornton writes that "... to the extent that terror destroys
only the keystone-symbol, the individual components of the
structure remain intact and available for restructuring along lines
desired by the insurgents." Thornton, 77.
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inability to fulfill the social contract; (2) set an example
for others so that they do not cross the organization; (3)
immobilize an audience so that they cease to act as supporters
or agents of the government; this includes, as Wickham-Crowley
writes, an attempt to stop "information leakage;" 4 ' (4)
disorientation, to isolate the audience from its normal
support structures;" and (5) the advertisement of the
group's presence, strength, or ideals/'' Sendero's use of
violence, as we will see in the case studies, closely
resembles this set of objectives.
Although Sendero is an unusually violent
organization, its use of terror, whether by threat or
violence, tends to be highly discriminating, unlike that of
the State. This has been noted in numerous accounts of the
war in Peru. While Sendero defines its enemies broadly,
violence is used against someone; a group of individuals; or
a village that has in some way violated Sendero rules, is
unpopular with the local community, or is in some way a





cl See Wickham-Crowley, Exporting Revolution, 75-80 for his
explanation of discrimination and guerrilla terror.
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supporter of the State.' - Terror is not used as a means in
and of itself, but as a means to an end.
This is not to say that Sendero ' s use of violence
is always successful, for that clearly is not the case.
Violence can also work against a revolutionary movement . For
example, when used in traditional societies that still
maintain extensive familial ties, each killing or act of
violence affects a large number of people, and, due to the
personal nature of the act, does not always have the effect of
neutralizing the populace. Nelson Manrique writes of specific
instances where the use of violence moved wide circles of
people to seek revenge. These revenge seekers were soon
employed by the army into civil patrols, a move that broadened
the war and ignited communal rivalries that had existed in
some cases from pre-colonial times. : - In this case, as in
others, excessive violence caused a backlash against the
revolutionary group, creating problems for the organization.
The use of violence, to be successful, must be carefully
-See, for instance, Carol Graham, "Sendero' s Law in Peru's
Shantytowns, " Wall Street Journal, 7 Jun 1991. Tom Mark's
interviews in Lima expand on Sendero 's use of terror. He quotes an
unnamed embassy official, "Sendero is brutal but not
indiscriminate... We are not witnessing pent-up rage exploding.
Rather we are seeing carefully designed and calculated terror...."
Tom Marks, "Making Revolution with Shining Path," in David Scott
Palmer, ed., Shining Path of Peru (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1992) , 196.
''Nelson Manrique, "Time of Fear, " NACLA Report on the Americas
Vol. 24, No. 4 (December /January 1990/1991): 36.
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calibrated to achieve the desired effect, for to exceed a
certain level can be detrimental to the cause.
Violence is the ultimate coercive inducement, and
is one that the Shining Path is not loathe to use. Terror,
however, does not always mean the killing or physical harm of
individuals. The threat of terror, if considered by the
audience to be credible, can be an equally effective coercive
tool. That is to say that an organization with coercive
capability, if it has demonstrated its willingness to follow
through on its threats, is more likely to have its warnings
heeded. While threats are often effective in reaching a
desired objective, they are not adequate by themselves to
achieve several of the objectives outlined above. Threats are
unlikely to allow an organization to advertise itself or
achieve the shock effect necessary to disorient a targeted
audience. Thus, threats are most likely to be effective if
either preceded or accompanied by actual violence.
How does the Shining Path get away with such
actions? In Peru the answer is twofold, and relatively
simple. First, Sendero is able to use terror and violence
because of the lack of a state coercive counterforce in much
of the country. If no credible counter-coercive force is
available, the Shining Path essentially has free rem.
Secondly, government forces often are not seen as a legitimate
alternative to the Shining Path. Peruvian security forces,
with their record of indiscriminate action, do not serve, for
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a large portion of the population, as a force to which a
threatened individual, village, or region can turn. * Thus,
the mass populace either must face SL alone or they must worry
about receiving similar abuse from government forces. Given
that, in general, Sendero intelligence is much better than the
government's, the squeezed masses may find a way to
accommodate the Shining Path; if they oppose SL, invariably
the organization will find out and take appropriate steps. On
the other hand, if one accommodates SL, government forces are
less likely to recognize one's role; if caught by government
forces one is more likely to be picked at random or
indiscriminately than based on hard evidence or good
intelligence. Thus, accommodation of the Shining Path, even
in government patrolled areas, is often the safest choice one
can make. Such are the harsh realities of being stuck, in the
eyes of many, between two bad alternatives.
Sendero 's use of terror provides it with many
positive returns. First, it can be used to force acquiescence
of a relatively large group of people. But terror can also
work against a revolutionary group just as it works against
the State. Sendero' s use of coercion to gain control of a
"' 4For an illustration of this dilemma, see Jo-Marie Burt,
"Counterinsurgency = Impunity," NACLA Report on the Americas Vol.
24, No. 4 (December/January 1990/1991): 30-31. Also, Mauceri,
"Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru," 91-92.
"'Thornton quotes Trotsky, who said that "the revolution...
kills individuals and intimidates thousands." Thornton, 88.
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region often elicits a positive response in the community, as
targets are normally those disliked or feared. However, once
in control of a region, Sendero is held to the same standards
as an established government, and coercion that is seen as
excessive or unwarranted breeds resentment, and the
organization may lose support.
This illustrates two points. First, contenders for
power are not held to the same standards as the incumbent.
Should Sendero gain power it is likely to be judged on the
same scale as the government, which is to say a more critical
scale. Second, Sendero 's vision of "the enemy" may, and often
does, differ from that of a targeted population. That is to
say, each may agree on the use of force against criminals or
corrupt officials; however, in the eyes of the targeted
audience, merely being in a position of authority is not
reason enough to kill local authorities. While this is
clearly not indiscriminate violence from SL's perspective, it
is in conflict with the peasant's vision of propriety. This
does not mean that Sendero will lose influence or support in
a region, but it does make the mission more difficult.
This illustrates how the use of violence can work against a
revolutionary movement. See, for example, Isbell's depiction of
Sendero 's campaign in the Rio Pampas Valley in the early and mid
1980s. Billie Jean Isbell, "Shining Path and Peasant Responses in
Rural Ayacucho," in Palmer, ed
.
, Shining Path of Peru, 61-78.
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b. "Sendero Law"
The impact of "Sendero law" in a region controlled
by the Shining Path was previously mentioned as an example of
a situation in which SL meets one of the pillars of the social
contract. This law, however, also has a clearly implied
coercive element, for the punishment for violation of the
newly imposed law is often harsh. "Sendero law" often goes
beyond mere punitive action against child molesters, wife
beaters, homosexuals, or common criminals; Sendero also
imposes rules that allow it to better prosecute its campaign
against the State. This can include, for instance, forbidding
peasants from planting or harvesting crops that exceed their
own subsistence needs, in an attempt to reduce or prevent the
flow of food into cities. In effect, those living under
"Sendero law" in SL controlled regions must deal with a whole
new administrative order that includes living under the threat
of SL retribution. When faced with this situation,
individuals have but two choices; either accommodate SL and
become, at a minimum, a passive supporter, or flee one's home
and village and join the migration to the cities-- a
dislocation that obviously does not guarantee escape from the
Shining Path.
Chalmers Johnson writes of the importance of
equilibrium between "values and division of labor." Peru, by
most standards, is a society in disequilibrium. Sendero uses
coercion to further that disequilibrium and induce local
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disorientation. If successful, "Sendero law" can create a new
equilibrium-- in other words, a new set of values and a new
division of labor. Attempting this in an equilibrated society
would be inordinately difficult. But in Peru's fractured
state, people need something to hold onto, a moral anchor.
Sendero provides that anchor. The implications for the State
are enormous, for if Sendero is successful in creating a "new
equilibrium, " the State would have to do much more than defeat
SL militarily-- it would then have to reassert or create its
own equilibrium. While this may sound extreme, recall the
above discussion of the social contract, and the fact that in
many cases the Shining Path is the element best equipped to
fulfill the State's obligations. Thus, the longer the war
with Sendero goes on, the more difficult becomes the mission
of the State; the mission becomes more than just defeating a
revolutionary group; it becomes the recreation of society.
3 . Case Studies
Thus far this chapter has documented the abstract
methods that Sendero uses to gain support by classifying their
methods into the broad categories of positive, negative, and
coercive inducements. The following case studies will show
how the Shining Path uses these inducements to attract
support, be it in the poverty-stricken southern highlands, the
relatively affluent profit-motivated cultivators of the Upper
Huallaga Valley, or the slums that surround the cities. These
cases will demonstrate the tactical flexibility of the Shining
Path and how it takes local, "bread and butter" issues and
makes them its own, rarely even mentioning the relatively
rigid ideology detailed above. James Scott writes of the
difficulty revolutionary movements can encounter in
reconciling their objectives for society with the often very
different desires of the peasants on whom they rely/
Sendero, at least during the recruitment phase, has thus far
skillfully and successfully negotiated that difficult
obstacle
.
a. SL in the Interior: The Battle for the Southern
Highlands
The first campaign this thesis will examine is the
Shining Path's attempts to build support in its home region of
the southern highlands . The nature of the southern highlands
is such that Sendero is able to operate largely free from
extensive government interference; often when government
interference was present, it is ineffectual in preventing the
insurgency's expansion.
Perhaps the best single illustration of Sendero'
s
flexibility and recruitment pattern in the southern highlands
is Ronald Berg's analysis of Sendero operations in
Andahuaylas . Andahuaylas province of Apurimac department,
c,7
James C. Scott, "Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and
Commissars," Theory and Society Vol . 7 (1979): 97-134.
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located approximately 50 miles southeast of Ayacucho.
Andahuaylas is a region similar to Ayacucho, with a poor
populace that has historically fared poorly, from the
haciendas through the Velasco-mspired cooperatives. 53
Velasco's land reforms and the demise of the haciendas created
an economic vacuum which was filled by entrepreneurs, who were
resented by many of the peasants that did not prosper or
better themselves during the changes of the 1970s. This
created a small number of successful peasants in the midst of
the majority, economically polarizing the peasant community.
Thus, when the Shining Path began its campaign in Andahuaylas
in 1981, it faced three conflictive situations in society.
First was peasant resentment of the cooperatives, which had in
some ways taken on a similar role as the detested haciendas
;
second, resentment toward the State for its role in
establishing the cooperatives and its long standing
association with the old exploitive elite; and finally, local
entrepreneurs for alleged excesses, corruption, and excessive
profiteering
.
Sendero's conduct of the campaign indicated an
understanding of these conflicts. Their first action in
Andahuaylas was to attack one of the conflictive symbols by
destroying machinery at one of the local farm cooperatives.
r
''Following case study derived from Ronald H. Berg, Sendero
Luminoso and the Peasantry of Andahuaylas," Journal of Inter-





The region's two cooperatives became SL's primary targets, and
within a year both had been ruined by Sendero attacks.
Sendero destroyed the farm equipment, and, in an example of
the use of positive inducements, contributed to material
security by either distributing the cooperative's remaining
produce among neighboring peasants or expropriating it
themselves. They also assassinated former leaders of the
cooperatives that had been accused of corruption.
Sendero exploited the second conflictive situation
by attacking state agencies associated with the cooperatives
or with commercial agriculture, which evidently had a marked
effect on other local government officials. All, including
judges, resigned from their positions/ Several local
officials were killed, including a judge who had been involved
in the agrarian reform movement that resulted in the
cooperatives. Additionally, in one instance Sendero beat a
judge accused of passing tips to the police, but allowed him
to live after what appears to be a "people's trial" rendered
its verdict
.
Sendero exploited the third conflictive situation
with a combination of positive and negative inducements. In
some cases they robbed stores and gave away the goods, and in
one case, redistributed cattle owned by wealthier land owners.
On another occasion, SL attacked a town, killed three major
'Ibid., 180.
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merchants, and either confiscated or distributed their goods.
All three merchants were unpopular, primarily due to their
wealth and exploitation of the peasants. Thus, Sendero
appealed to the peasant resentment of those better off than
themselves by use of negative inducements that address their
desire for revenge or punishment against those who have
bettered themselves at the expense of their villagers. The
positive inducement comes from the satisfaction, however short
term it may be, of the peasant desire or need of the goods
confiscated from local merchants.
The above description is but a very broad brush of
Sendero 's actions in Andahuaylas, but several important
conclusions can be drawn from the characterization. First,
the level of precision with which the Shining Path guerrillas
dissected the Andahuaylan social and economic concerns
indicates that the senderistas either conducted much research
on the targeted province or had covert sympathizers in place.
This is in line with past SL practice and analysis that
concluded that Sendero rarely shows its hand before it is
ready to act. 1 ' Second, those conflictive segments of
society were heavily targeted; each was attacked in brutal
fashion, and perhaps received great publicity at the time for
their brutality. Yet each target was attacked and dealt with
to serve as a negative inducement for the local populace.
'McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities, 12
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Further, Sendero did not demonstrate a propensity to attack
elements of society indiscriminately. This conforms with
observations made throughout Peru, where targets or personnel
are attacked either because of their position in society
(government association, wealth, etc.), opposition to the
Shining Path, or disfavor in a Sendero-targeted region. We
again see confirmation of the now generally held view that
while its list of enemies may be long and broad, Sendero
rarely attacks randomly.
Berg, in fact, found that the Shining Path's
campaign was indeed successful in gaining a measure of peasant
support. Perhaps the best example cited is the ways the
Andahuaylan peasants referred to members of SL . In 1982
senderistas were known as "terrorists." By 1985, they were
often called "comrades." 1"-
Sendero 's brutal but relatively precise targeting
of specific issues in Andahuaylas is marked in contrast to
police methods, which typically consisted of random violence.
With their characteristically weak intelligence, the police
forces typically searched houses, rounded up suspected
''One finds much evidence to support this proposition. For
instance, a human rights worker from Ayacucho reported, "Sendero
investigate and decide who to kill-- they may be common criminals,
rapists, or informers, but there is always a reason. But when
teachers or women disappear, then it's the army." Reported in
Sally Bowen, "Peru Harnesses Peasant Power to Combat Guerrillas,"
Financial Times, 31 May 91.
-Berg, 18 9.
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senderistas and sympathizers, conducted interrogations and
torture. Other police actions included indiscriminate
beatings, and on at least one occasion, the rape of two women.
This was part of a general pattern of police and paramilitary
behavior towards the peasantry which cannot help but further
discredit the government in the minds of the peasant populace
by contributing to what Chalmers Johnson calls power
deflation, and by contrast boost the appeal of Sendero.
This case is representative of Sendero forays in
the sierra. While the basic tactics may be similar, the
actual issues addressed vary with the targeted locale. The
mission is the same: break the region's ties to the central
government, break down local elite objection to the
organization, and, most importantly, address issues important
to the target . Once that is done and the group has gained a
degree of authority in the region, Sendero will work to
address its own concerns, and, if successful, impose "Sendero
law. "
b. SL in the Interior: The Battle for the Upper
Huallaga Valley
The situation in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) in
the early 1980s was far different from that of Andahuaylas.
In contrast to Andahuaylas, the UHV had several additional
actors, both internal and external, with which to contend.
'Johnson, 9 3
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First was the presence of representatives of the various
Colombian drug cartels, thoroughly capitalist external actors
who acted as the market for peasant -grown coca paste. Second
was the presence of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
(MRTA) , Peru's other revolutionary group, which was looking to
gain power and political support in the valley. Thirdly, the
Peruvian police and military forces were present in the UHV on
a more sustained basis, propelled by the intensive attention
given to the coca crop by the United States. A final
difference was that while the peasants of Andahuaylas were
generally subsistence farmers, the average coca-growing
peasant in the UHV is a participant in Peru's export market
and thus, realized or not, a capitalist. Thus, Sendero
clearly faced a different environment in which it would have
to operate to expand its influence and improve its overall
position. This essay will address Sendero's response to each
factor in succession.
Prior to the Shining Path's military appearance in
the UHV, drug traffickers ran roughshod over the growers. The
traffickers refused to negotiate over the price of coca, and
enforced informal "death sentences" on growers unable to
deliver the proper amount of coca. Additionally, cartel-
financed gangs prevented any peasant move toward organizing
themselves, breaking up meetings and killing the leaders."
4Tarazona-Sevillano, 117.
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Sendero's response to this situation was to move into an area,
arrange meetings for ideological speeches, and then question
the townspeople about the gangs and other problems. Once the
gang members were known, Sendero either banished or executed
them.' Thus Sendero used a positive inducement by
fulfilling the first requirement of the social contract,
acting as the guarantor of security from an external power by
serving as a buffer between the Colombians and the peasants.
Additionally, Sendero, in exchange for taxing the growers five
percent of the value of their product, has worked to raise the
price of the coca, in effect lining their own pockets while
also increasing the grower's profit-- again contributing to
the social contract by guaranteeing material security." 6
These are not isolated cases, as Sendero often acts in ways
that appeal to the local peasant population. However, this is
a case of the organization operating successfully in an
environment radically different from its home bases in
southern Peru.
This is not to say that Sendero has completely
alienated the Colombians. Despite the obvious contradiction
with Sendero ideology, SL has thus far worked out a modus
Vivendi with the traffickers whereby each benefits. In return
for charging the cartels periodically for access to the coca,
r
Ibid.
McClintock, "Peru," LACCR, B162
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Sendero provides the traffickers three benefits: discipline
among the peasants, protection from state interference, and
the promise of further destabilizat ion of the Peruvian
government, a situation which can only increase the
availability of coca.
Sendero and the MRTA had been competing for power
in the UHV since the early 1980s. Although Sendero was the
more powerful of the groups, both militarily and socially,
they nevertheless formed an alliance with the cartel, and
together they forced the MRTA out of the regions in the UHV
where the MRTA maintained a power base.' : Thus, after first
confronting the cartel's hegemony over the peasant growers,
Sendero then was able to use or work with the Colombians to
further consolidate its political hold over the valley.
While Sendero' s actions against the traffickers
enhanced its appeal to the peasant growers, nothing has
benefitted the Shining Path politically as much as its
response to governmental actions in the UHV. In this
instance, the Shining Path was fortunate that the government
delivered two important issues to exploit, which Sendero
handled successfully.
The first issue was the economic issue. In the
early 1980s the government initiated two programs to limit the




growth of coca. One, the Special Project for the Upper
Huallaga (PEAH), was designed as a crop substitution program,
which has thus far failed. The second, the Agreement for the
Control and Reduction of Coca in the Upper Huallaga (CORAH)
was a coca eradication program, and the program that most
agitated the local populace. To the farmers, these programs
were seen as threats to their only means of survival . The
State became an "element of alienation" '' to the peasants of
the UHV as it acted, in the eyes of the farmers, to
consciously break the social contract and actively deprive its
citizens of material security, and drove the growers into the
a rms of S L
.
The second issue handed to Sendero was not only the
US support and backing of these programs, but the actual
presence of US agents in the valley. This led to fear and
distrust of the United States, opening up the issue of
interventionism, nationalism, and US imperialism for Sendero
to use to gain peasant support.
Sendero was able to use each of these governmental
gifts skillfully. Sendero responded to the first by
protecting the growers from the government eradication teams
and by attacking personnel associated with the military,
'Tarazona-Sevillano, 111.
48
police, and workers from CORAH. ' Sendero used the presence
of US agents primarily for ideological purposes, by denouncing
the US imperialists as the primary cause of the grower's
problems. Tarazona-Sevillano quotes a US Drug Enforcement
Agency agent who sums up the rhetorical bonanza handed to SL
by stating, "You'll have imperialists cutting down coca trees
in front of a crying peasant woman. Mao could not have
thought of anything better." '
Although the Colombian cartels have benefitted
somewhat from the agreement forged with Sendero, the clear
winners are the peasants and Sendero itself. While Sendero
has not spared the peasantry from its wrath on certain
occasions, the order Sendero imposed in the valley has worked
to the growers' advantage, as they are now protected from the
intimidation of the traffickers, and protected to a degree
from government forces. While Sendero has imposed conditions
on the peasantry for their protection, overall the costs are
low. The five percent tax on coca leaf is seen as a cost of
doing business, but one whose benefits far outweigh the
'The military cooperated with Sendero, as their policy of
changing military emergency zone commanders every year resulted in
ever-changing counterinsurgency strategies that never had the time
to succeed or fail, and prevented the zone commanders (typically
white generals from the coast) from ever developing an
understanding of their task and the situation. See Mauceri,
"Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru," 98-99.
71Alan Riding, "Rebels Disrupting Coca Eradication in Peru,
"
New York Times, 26 Jan 89, quoted by Tarazona-Sevillano, 111.
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disadvantages/" Most growers are better off under Sendero
than they were when they were subject to the wrath and whims
of the cartels . 73
An additional economic benefit the growers have
gained from Sendero is a measure of protection from price
gouging. Because coca is so nutrient demanding, much of the
soil in the UHV is in poor condition, thus making it difficult
to grow food. Sendero has responded by limiting the price of
fertilizer, which, according to Sendero sources, had been
marked up extraordinarily high. While Sendero does not state
whether the growth of food is of the growers' volition or in
response to a Sendero order, nevertheless the organization has
limited price gouging in the fertilizer market. 74 And even
if the growth of food is mandated by SL, the average grower's
family earnings far exceed that of the average Peruvian.
Needless to say, support for the Shining Path has grown
substantially, and Sendero is the dominant political actor in
7
~'And, according to Moore's social contract, taxation is within
the bounds of acceptability-- if the government or authority is
fulfilling its obligations, as the Shining Path is doing.




Even with a poor yield, Tarazona-Sevillano reports that the
average annual earnings comes to approximately $3 63 6 before
expenses, compared to Peru's per capita income of $1,000. Coca
yields a price about 10 times higher than food crops, and often the
narcotraficantes (drug cartels from Colombia) pay in advance.
Tarazona-Sevillano, 116.
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the region." The UHV has become one of Sendero's greatest
successes, and is now probably its strongest support base.
Sendero's collaboration with the peasant growers
does not come without a substantial compromise on its part, as
the tolerance of such a capitalist society dependent upon a
decadent product contradicts SL's socialist vision. Sendero's
distaste for drug trafficking is evident in internal writings.
For instance, El Diario writes, "In the Open People's
Committees one can sense the determination of the people led
by the PCP to develop a self-sufficient economic system that
no longer depends on dollars from the sale of coca leaves."'' 3
Additionally, when pressed on the issue of Sendero support of
the drug trade, Sendero's representative in Europe, publisher
of El Diario, and Guzman interviewer, Luis Arce Borja stated
The Shining Path organization supports the people, the
exploited peasant... Drug trafficking is not a problem
that the armed struggle wants to resolve for the time
being. This is a more serious problem that the rev-
olution will resolve in due time. The problem of drug
trafficking and coca growing will be definitely solved as
soon as the PCP takes power, and not before then.
Sendero's drive to control the UHV represents
another clear example of an organization flexible enough to
'McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 22.
Although this base of support was at first based solely on
economic considerations, Sendero is now winning "hearts and minds"
as well. Tarazona-Sevillano, 116 and 120.
73El Diario Internacional , August -September 1991, 9
7
"FBIS-LAT-91-226, 22 Nov 91, 39, quoting an interview in
Expreso, 10 Nov 91.
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adapt to local conditions. Sendero gained the support of the
peasant through the provision of positive inducements by
protecting him from the government and the cartels, yet was
still able to reach tactical compromises with the cartels on
coca prices, access to the valley, and order in the peasant
communities. Sendero even forged alliances with the
traffickers to fight the government and the MRTA-- despite the
fact that Sendero scorns much of what the Colombians
represent. 7 Additionally, in return for the support of the
peasant, Sendero has tolerated trade that is contrary to the
values of the organization. While Sendero's long-term support
for these activities is suspect, Sendero has shown that it can
compromise its puritanical side to gain a tactical advantage
that benefits its overall strategic goals.
c. SL in the Cities: The Battle for Urban Support
Before proceeding with this section, several
factors must be noted. First, the urban campaign is more
recent and less developed than that in rural areas, as Sendero
did not start to see the cities as an important part of its
campaign for victory until 1985. ^ Secondly, the Shining
Path faces obstacles in the urban campaign not present in the
: The Colombians are seen by the puritanical Shining Path as
excessive drinkers, overbearingly loud in their parties, and
extravagant in their dress.
31McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities, 6. Although
Sendero's actual rural campaign began in 1980, it had spent the
greater part of the 1970s laying the groundwork.
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countryside. First, unlike much of the countryside, the
cities are not "virgin soil," devoid of governmental
influence. To gain influence in these urban settings the
Shining Path must recruit within a far more diverse social,
economic and political setting.'- Urban occupations are
more diverse, and political competition from incumbent and
parties of the legal left is more prevalent. Second, many of
the inhabitants of the cities, particularly the shantytowns,
are former rural peasants who fled Sendero violence; these
people should be, by definition, less receptive to the Shining
Path's overtures. Finally, the State's coercive arms are
deployed far more densely in the cities, making attacks more
complicated and dangerous.'' With these factors in mind, one
still sees evidence of SL's flexibility in its urban conduct.
While data on Sendero' s local-level actions in the
cities are sketchy, the pattern of its flexibility and use of
local issues, although less sophisticated than in rural cases,
is still apparent. For example, La Republica reports that
when Sendero attempts to compete with the legal left, it
employs the same basic promises as the legal left, such as
shortages of food and electricity. For instance, SL graffiti
:
-McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities, 58.
"'For a more thorough discussion of the difficulties inherent
in the urban campaign, see McCormick, "Problems of the Urban
Underground," in From the Sierra to the Cities, 55-73.
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in the Campo Grade pueblo jovenes reads "For water and light,
fight and resist."" 4
Additionally, Sendero learned from its mistakes in
attempting to win over individual shantytowns . In 1983, SL
attempted to infiltrate and control a shantytown in Huancayan,
but was soon overrun by traditional political parties and
interest groups, attracted to Huancayan 's large and expanding
population. From this experience, Sendero learned to target
smaller, poorer, and less politicized shantytowns, where it
would face less political competition.
Sendero also created its own shantytown, Raucana,
which it hoped to use as a model community to lure a larger
following in other shantytowns. Under Sendero control, the
shantytown residents dug their own wells, raised lampposts for
electricity, and laid out streets, and generally created a




This is an attempt to begin to address
the largest issue in the shantytowns, which is the basic
services not provided by the government, such as sanitation,
potable water, basic health care, electricity, and other
quality of life issues. Granted, this is very difficult, as
r
^FBIS-LAT-91-178, 13 Sep 91, 34, quoting La Republica, 1 Sep
91.
' r
FBIS-LAT-91-178, 13 Sep 91, 36-37, citing La Republica, 1 Sep
91.
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Sendero is faced with a conservative population, r and is
operating under close supervision of the armed forces or
police. But the attempt is being made. The creation of its
own shantytowns gives the Shining Path an additional
advantage, as it allows the organization to influence all
aspects of daily life from the outset, without having to
compete with other, established organizations.' Thus, to
further its influence in this manner, the Shining Path is
apparently organizing land seizures to increase the number of
shantytowns under its control."
In the shantytown of Huascar, Sendero found and
successfully exploited a negative inducement by seizing the
issue of official corruption, and has thus targeted government
officials for elimination.' In this case, two purposes are
served. First, Sendero is able to address a local area of
concern for the residents, one for which they hope to be
rewarded with support. Secondly, Sendero is given the
opportunity to reduce or eliminate the government's reach into
Huascar, providing Sendero additional space from which it can
*' See Susan C. Stokes, "Politics and Latin America's Urban
Poor: Reflections from a Lima Shantytown, " Latin American Research
Review Vol. 26, No. 2 (1991): 75-99.
" 7Michael L. Smith, "Shining Path's Urban Strategy: Ate
Vitarte," in Palmer, ed
.
, Shining Path of Peru, 143.
i8Ibid.
"Carol Graham, " Sendero 's Law in Peru's Shantytowns," Wall
Street Journal, 7 Jun 91.
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use political mobilization, terror, or the threat of terror to
enforce its will, and to address other conflictive situations
in the community to build real political support.
On a more general level, the Shining Path continues
to work to infiltrate local organizations, which gives it two
alternatives, both in its interests, with which to exploit.
First, Sendero would like to be able to take control of the
organization, as it was able to do with the primary teachers
union, SUTEP, and the newspaper El Diario. If unable to
actually gain control of the organization, penetration allows
it to gather intelligence on organizational actions, and
either influence actions or intimidate to serve SL's
purposes .
'
Although the above examples are less clear than the
cases from the interior, the evidence from the cities
demonstrates several samples of Sendero modifying its methods
to suit local conditions. First, Sendero has been flexible
enough to slowly exert its influence within organizations it
does not completely control. Second, the evidence shows that
Sendero can in fact operate in a more crowded arena and in an
arena in which it is neither the first political actor nor the
most powerful. Thus, one should not be surprised that the
Shining Path has been less successful or slower in selling
'"Smith, 137-140. Smith writes that a grass-roots tradition
of democratic tolerance of radicals has allowed the Shining Path to
gain such footholds.
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itself in the cities. Regardless, the available evidence
clearly demonstrates that the Shining Path is a tactically
flexible organization able to alter its methods and message to
suit local needs, yet still keep itself focused on the overall
goal .
C. CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the Shining Path's ideological
foundations and found that in fact the conventional wisdom
that depicts the organization as a dogmatic, ideologically
rigid organization is generally accurate. However, once SL
moves beyond its ideology into the realm of strategy and
tactics, a completely different picture emerges, as it has
been able to subordinate its ideological beliefs to further
long range goals. The Shining Path significantly altered its
strategy in the mid-1980s to better address the urban
component of the war. At the operational level of prosecuting
the revolution, Sendero, using the framework of inducements,
is remarkably flexible in addressing local issues and using
them in the context of its overall goals. The above review of
three very different scenarios draws a picture of an
organization that is as adept at operating with subsistence
peasants as it is at crafting a foreign policy that limits yet
also harnesses the power of a foreign actor in serving its
interests .
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The implications of this flexibility is disturbing for
Peru. Initially portrayed as an Indian and then as a peasant
group, the Shining Path has shown the capacity to expand
beyond those bounds to enlist the support of a larger spectrum
of supporters. This does not in any way diminish the role of
coercion or violence in the expansion of the revolution, but
it does demonstrate that Sendero is capable of expanding its
influence beyond expected boundaries. It makes the
underestimation of Sendero 's abilities to move into and
organize new regions a highly risky assumption.
Further, the Shining Path's demonstrated flexibility
indicates that the organization may have the institutional
capability to adapt and proceed despite Guzman's capture.
Were the Shining Path slavishly devoted to its ideology at the
strategic and tactical level, unable to adapt to changing
conditions, Peru's would have little to fear, for the
organization, not having been adaptable during its campaign,
would be unlikely to be able to adapt to this situation
either. If SL were rigid and ideologically bound at all
echelons of operation it could perhaps continue to create
problems, but these problems would likely remain local and,
while perhaps violent, would not pose a threat to the State's
stability and overall national economic and political order.
The Shining Path, though, has already demonstrated its ability
to adapt to local conditions both in its tactics and its
recruitment message. This obviously does not mean that
Sendero will successfully recover from Guzman's capture, but
it does make the potent lal for success greater.
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III. SHINING PATH'S APPEAL
The above chapter addressed the ideology, strategy, and
tactics used by the Shining Path to gain support among
targeted audiences around the Peru. These audiences are made
up of a number of constituencies, or relatively independent
interest groups, that form any gathering of people, whether it
be a highland village or a shantytown near Lima. This chapter
will address the organization's appeal from a lower level of
analysis, focusing on the appeal to the specific targeted
constituencies that make up the highland villages and urban
shantytowns . This section will examine which issues and types
of issues Sendero employs, and which sectors of society are
targeted or attracted by the message.
Again, despite its depiction as a rigid organization, the
Shining Path demonstrates its flexibility by appealing to a
number of segments of people in Peruvian society. Much of
this appeal is based on the economic problems that grip Peru,
but nevertheless, many different bases of support are
targeted, and often reached, belying the notion of an





One group that is a natural Sendero target is the poor of
Lima. This group, with the lowest capacity to accept further
economic hardship, has suffered the most under the
hyperinflation and economic contraction of Alan Garcia 's final
two years in office, and has borne the brunt of Fujimori's
economic program. Fujimori's program has had the short-term
effect of increasing poverty and unemployment, even though
Peru had already seen its poverty rate almost double in the
last three years.'' 1 When dealing with the poor sectors,
Sendero can gain the loyalty of people by just the promise of
a better life. As a report in La Republica stated,
It is well known that the SL seeks to settle in the
poorest sectors to garner their support... Anyone who is
able to organize them under the promise of giving them a
house and some kind of order in which to exist will
receive some obedience and sympathy from them. '-
Why do they believe the Shining Path? Because the current
regime is unable to deliver a measure of good to the poor.
Juan J. Linz writes that a legitimate regime that has been
effective and efficacious can build a reservoir of goodwill
that can be drawn upon during harsh times." 1 However, the
'''James Brooke, "Marxist Revolt Grows Strong In the Shantytowns
of Peru," New York Times, 11 Nov 91.
'-FBIS-LAT-91-178, 13 Sep 91, 37, quoting from La Republica,
1 Sep 91.
,,jJuan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis,
Breakdown, & Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1978) , 21.
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Peruvian government does not have a reservoir of trust or
goodwill, as it is not seen as efficient or efficacious by the
poor. The government, when present at all in the pueblos
jovenes, is not seen as a legitimate actor. ,M
A further rationale for the poor's support for the Shining
Path is given by the moral economist's explanation of
revolution. If one extrapolates James C. Scott's subsistence
crisis into the notion of a moral economy," one can argue
that government policies have had the effect of threatening
the very existence of the poor, leaving them in the position
of "that of a man standing permanently up to the neck in
water, so that even a ripple may drown him.""' From this
perspective, the poor's support is not so much an indication
of a vote "for" the Shining Path but a vote "against" current
leaders
.
' 4Carol Graham, "Sendero's Law in Peru's Shantytowns , " Wall
Street Journal, 7 Jun 91. Graham writes that (in Huascar, a Lima
shantytown) , "Where state officials are present, they are known for
their corruption and inefficiency rather than anything else....
'The only good thing about Sendero is that they kill the corrupt
state officials' one Huascar women told me." Further, the pueblos
jovenes are not new to Lima, as they have existed since at least
1980. See Kenneth Freed, "Death Scene: Outrageous Peru Slums,"
Los Angeles Times, 21 Oct 80.
'"James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1976) .
"Scott, quoting Tawney, vii.
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B. LANDLESS OR LAND DEFICIENT PEASANT
In the countryside, the Shining Path is able to appeal to
an analogous group, the landless peasant, and official Sendero
writings recognize their standing as a natural ally. In the
1987 Bases of Discussion, Sendero states that "The peasants,
being the primary force, especially the poor peasants,
struggle for the armed conquest of land under the leadership
of the Communist Party..." 1 Additionally, in the 1988
interview Guzman speaks of the importance of land distribution
in such a way as to appeal to those neglected by Peru's land
tenure system. When questioned about whether Sendero would
confiscate all kinds of property, Guzman responded with
We are for the destruction of semif eudalism, implementing
the great slogan that is still valid: 'land to the
tiller.' It is good to emphasize this, because many
things are said about it. Mao stressed this slogan again
and again, which for us means the destruction of semi-
feudal property and the distribution of the land as
property to the peasantry, mainly the poor peasantry.' 1
Clearly, the statements made above regarding efficiency,
efficacy, and the threat, to moral economy apply equally in the
interior. Indeed, they are likely to apply more in the
interior, as the State's historic inattention and neglect is
a major reason that Sendero was able to form and expand in the
1970s and early 1980s.
'PCP, Bases for Discussion, C322
^Guzman interview, 74-75.
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C. UNIVERSITY STUDENTS /GRADUATES
Again in the cities, the Shining Path holds an appeal to
university students and graduates. Marxism holds a certain
appeal in universities worldwide, and Peru is no different.
However, for Sendero's purposes, Peru has the added dimension
of economic catastrophe, as students do not see any hope of
using their skills or knowledge under such conditions. Only
nine percent of Lima's economically active population is
"adequately employed."
An example of this phenomenon is Teresa Angelica Cardenas
Lopez, now a Sendero leader. Educated as an anthropologist,
she was not able to find work after graduation. Frustrated
and in poverty, she joined Sendero. 1 " 1 According to
Tarazona-Sevillano, this is a typical scenario; university
graduates, unable to find employment, become disillusioned and
decide to change the existing system. 101 Sendero's strength
in the universities is seen by reporting from Lima in which in
a roundup of Sendero members, where most were "... students
from the University of San Marcos, the Catholic University,
and the Engineering University, as well as lawyers and high




school teachers." 10 - Further, an October 1991 report from
Lima reported that Guzman had lived at the Enrique Guzman
Valle National University in La Cantuta in early 1991.
'
: To
counter Sendero ' s influence on college campuses, the military
in early 1992 occupied five campuses. This was done,
according to Defense Minister Malca Villanueva, to "restore
authority, " citing evidence that the Shining Path was
proselytizing in the dining halls and residences.' 14
Wickham-Crowley points out that Latin American
universities, despite the fact that they are inclined to
perpetuate the elite rather than offering opportunity across
society, tend to be further to the left than the national
populace. Xl Further, he notes a correlation between large
increases in university enrollment and revolutionary
activity.- Between 1965 and 1975, university enrollment in
Peru rose by 189 percent, the 14th fastest increase in Latin
America. : " While Wickham-Crowley does not view Peru as
-FBIS-LAT-91-240, 13 Dec 91, 55, quoting Lima Global de
Television Network, 4 Dec 91.
TBIS-LAT-91-204, 22 Oct 91, 43, quoting Expreso, 15 Oct 91.
i04FBIS-LAT-92-051, 16 Mar 92, 38-39, referencing El Comercio,
13 Feb 92.
ll,r,Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in





demonstrating a positive correlation with his hypothesis, I
would content that a 189 percent increase is substantial, even
if it is not one of the highest growth rates in the region,
and supports the hypothesis that correlates university
enrollment increases with revolutionary activity.
D . WOMEN
Sendero's appeal to women has been particularly
noteworthy. Both Mao and Mariategui noted the discrimination
and exploitation faced by women. According to Mao, women in
semif eudal/semicolonial societies suffer from four categories
of oppression: political, societal, marital, and religious.
Guzman continues this line of thinking, and teaches that women
must be aware of their double exploitation - class and sex -
and that they must fight both. And in fact both are correct.
Rape goes virtually unpunished in Peru, and literacy laws
prevented uneducated women from voting until 1980. l '
'
SL's outreach towards women is not a new phenomena, as in
the 1970s the organization's Movimiento Femenino Popular
published feminist booklets and its own magazine, Women Speak
'Robin Kirk, "The Deadly Women of the Shining Path, " San
Francisco Examiner, Image section, 22 Mar 92, 16. Kirk writes that
the saying "Mas me pega, mas te quiero" ("The more you hit me, the
more I'll love you") is still common in Peru.
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Out. 10 " Further, Sendero has backed its message with action;
although no one is sure of the representation of women in the
Shining Path, estimates range as high as 50 percent. 110
Numbers, however, do not tell the complete story, as women are
often assigned the psychologically important role of
delivering the lethal shot during most major
assassinations. 111 This indicates a willingness to entrust
difficult and challenging responsibilities to women.
Additionally, women have been given positions of
leadership in the organization. Tarazona-Sevillano mentions
two women by name believed to sit on Sendero 's Central
Committee, 1 *- and Kirk writes that police intelligence
documents list eight women on the 19 member Central Committee
and two of the five members of the political bureau. 1 The
best evidence of Sendero 's trust of women's leadership ability
was demonstrated in Guzman's 12 Sep 92 capture. During that
U)C,Carol Andreas, "Women at War," NACLA Report on the Americas
Vol. 24, No. 4 (December-January 1990-1991): 22.
u
"Wickham-Crowley , Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America,
215. Kirk uses similarly imprecise but more current figures, and
writes, "Members of The Shining Path claim that 40 percent of their
militants are female. A third of the approximately 1,000 people
who are currently held on terrorism charges related to the Shining
Path are women." Kirk, 16. Andreas traces the large numbers of









operation, four Sendero Politburo members were also captured,
including three women. These women are Elena Albertina
Iparraguirre, Maria Panto j a Sanchez, and Laura Zambrano
Padilla. Albertina Iparraguirre was Guzman's companion and an
influential member of the Central Committee, and Zambrano
Padilla, as mentioned earlier, was commander of the Lima
Metropolitan Committee and believed to be Guzman's second in
command. 114 Finally, one of the best known senderistas
after Guzman is Edith Lagos, known for masterminding a
spectacular prison escape in 1982. Her funeral (later in
1982) was attended by a reported 30,000 people, and she became
a martyr of the revolution. 115
E . YOUTH
A fifth group that the Shining Path sees as a natural
support base and one which it expends much energy recruiting
is the country's youth. The appeal here is also tied to the
economic despair felt by Peru's youth, who see no opportunity
for advancement. Bases for Discussion states "We must
mobilize youths to participate directly . . . They must develop
U4
"Politburo Members Arrested with Guzman Viewed," El
Comercio, 16 Sep 92; also, "Shining Path Leader Zambrano ' s Arrest
Detailed," La Republica, 16 Sep 92, both cited in FBIS-LAT-92-186
,
24 Sep 92, 22-23.
115 Ibid., 17.
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their struggles for a new world, their right to an education,
and freedom from unemployment and other ills." 11 "
A primary mechanism for gaining the loyalty of the young
is through school education. Guzman realized the importance
of youth early in his career at the University of Huamanga,
and assiduously recruited teachers to go into the countryside
to teach the young peasants at both the primary and secondary
school level. 11 ' Again we come to the "virgin soil" theory,
as Sendero believes that the youth have no political "bad
habits" to unlearn. Additionally, many youth became members
of the organization, routinely taking up arms in their early
teens. Sendero 's recruitment of the youth is not limited to
schools in the highlands, as Army intelligence has found that
the Shining Path conducts schools in Lima shantytowns . These
"popular schools" have taken hold and Sendero' s mission made
easier, according to Expreso, by the "state of abandonment in
which the children and their parents find themselves in
recently occupied plots which still lack public schools
services." 1 Thus, in dealing with Peru's youth, Sendero
has been exploiting virgin soil with political indoctrination
in both the interior and in Lima's slums.
llbPCP, Bases for Discussion, C323.
117McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 13.
niFBIS-LAT-91-214, 5 Nov 91, 39, quoting Expreso, 25 Oct 91
69
F. SURVEY DATA
Given these group appeals, how much of Peruvian society
actually supports the Shining Path? Accurate information on
Sendero's base of support is difficult or impossible to
obtain. Many supporters, given a traditional distrust of the
central authorities (especially after the 5 April 92 coup)
,
would likely not report their sentiments accurately.
Additionally, given Sendero's strength in the interior, and
its policy of targeting those perceived of as supporting the
government, it is understandable that researchers would be
loathe to gather data on Sendero's support in the highlands.
However, an Apoyo poll conducted in Lima in June 1991 offers
some indication
.
119 The poll found that, as one would
expect, the bulk of Sendero's support lies in the lower two
strata of Peruvian society.
The poll indicates that the Shining Path has the overt
support of or a favorable image among 7.14 percent of Lima's
population. This number should be considered as an absolute
minimum given the above mentioned reluctance of individuals to
commit overtly to Sendero . Apoyo ' s director of public opinion
believes that one can plausibly add 50 percent of those who
did not specify an opinion to the ranks of Sendero supporters.
If this is done, Sendero's support in Lima rises to 12 percent
"Following data from FBIS-LAT-91 -202 , 18 Oct 91, 33-38,
citing Quehacer, Jul-Aug 91.
70
of the population. The study further found that 41 percent of
the two lowest strata of society feel that subversion is
justifiable; this 41 percent equates to 15 percent of
Metropolitan Lima's population. The study indicates a growing
class polarization in Lima, with the top echelon of society
hardening in their opposition to the Shining Path while
support for SL increases among the lower strata. This
indicates that, if the government and Sendero are in a battle
for the "hearts and minds" of Lima's citizens, the battlefield
will become the second level of Peruvian society, nine percent
of which considers subversion justified, and eight percent of
which has a favorable opinion of Abimael Guzman.
G. CONCLUSION
Despite the traditional portrayal of a rigidly determined,
ideological organization, Sendero has the capacity to appeal
to a wide range of Peruvian society. Three of those appeal
groups-- women, youth, and university students-- hold the
potential for cross class appeal, giving Sendero the capacity
to significantly expand its traditional base. Although much
of Sendero' s appeal stems from the dismal state of the
Peruvian economy and from the lack of opportunity for
university students and youth, the notion that Sendero appeals
only to a narrow segment of Peru's population is outdated at
best and dangerous at worst, for to underestimate Sendero is
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to limit one's ability to respond to its political and
military operations.
The Shining Path's potential appeal across society has
further dangerous implications for the current order in Peru.
Although its use of violence deters many from Sendero's cause,
the government's absence as a legitimate countervailing force
in much of the State leaves many Peruvians with no real choice
but to accommodate the organization. If SL becomes more
successful and increases its scope and intensity of attacks on
the existing State, one must consider how many of the above-
described groups will, using Samuel L. Popkin's model of the
rational peasant, calculate that their own well being is more
likely to be fulfilled by Sendero. 1J0 How many Peruvians
will, should a Sendero victory appears more certain, decide to
back the apparent winner to make the new order more hospitable
to their interests? Should this occur, it would almost
inevitably happen at the precise moment when the government's
need for support is most crucial, as such shifts toward
Sendero would likely occur as Sendero's strength was gathering
momentum. While the capture of Guzman clearly lowers the
short-term threat, this principle is still important. The
importance of the Shining Path's potentially wide, cross-class
appeal is that, should momentum toward victory accelerate,
"Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1979), especially chapters 1, 2,
and 6 .
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many groups of people would have not only the "rational
peasant" reason to back SL but also those Sendero appeals that
have preceded and would help legitimate their shift towards
the Shining Path. These appeals would make their conversion
to the cause appear less opportunistic, regardless of the
motivation, and make their acceptance by SL more likely,
circumstances that could make the shift from government
supporter to Sendero supporter an easier one to make,
particularly in a deteriorating environment.
The implications for Sendero 's appeal toward the
constituent groups identified above should make Peru's elite
uncomfortable. While the immediate threat of Sendero appears
to be diminished with Guzman's capture, little progress has
been made to lure the above groups into the government's base
of support. Until this is done, Peru will be, to a certain
degree, a State awaiting Sendero' s return, not a State
actively attempting to address the insurgency. This, when
combined with the Shining Path flexibility demonstrated in the
previous chapter, should cause Peru's leadership to rethink
the apparent stability of their societies and formulate plans




Scholars have analyzed many conditions that make Peru
vulnerable to a revolutionary movement. David Scott Palmer
points to several factors that led to extreme hardship in
Peru, opening the door for Sendero. At the national level, he
notes the severe economic decline that began in 1976 eroded
both real wages and social living standards. At the local
level Palmer points to the numerous changes that occurred in
Ayacucho department that, reminiscent of Davies ' "J-curve,"




On a more theoretical level, Wickham-Crowley applies four
theories of revolution to present-day Peru, finding three that
apply.'-- Specifically, citing Cynthia McClintock's work, he
posits a subsistence crisis in Ayacucho combined with
discontent over social conditions to make Peru an example of
Scott's "moral economy" theory of revolution. -- Secondly,
''-"'David Scott Palmer, "Rebellion in Rural Peru, " Comparative
Politics Vol. 18 (January 1986): 130-134. For the theoretical
justif ication of the "J-curve," see James C. Davies, "Toward a
Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review Vol. 6, No. 1
(February 1962) : 5-19 .
--Only Jeffery Paige's theory of agrarian structures and
revolution did not apply.
'-'Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America,
245-246. Theory developed in James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of
the Peasant. The application to Peru made in Cynthia McClintock,
74
Sendero illustrates the "tapping of rebellious cultures"
theory, as Ayacucho was the home to Hector Bejar's ELN in
1965; " -4 more ominously, and descriptive of Sendero 's spread
beyond Ayacucho, Wickham-Crowley observes that "A survey of
peasant movements in Peru makes it quite clear that virtually
the entire Sierra has been the site of scattered or intense
peasant resistance and agitation for at least the last
century."-" (emphasis added) Finally, Wickham-Crowley
applies the "resource mobilization theory" and found it
applicable, noting that Sendero uses language, educational,
family, religious, and political ties to mobilize the
peasantry for insurgency. 1- '
These theories, while useful in explaining the rise of
Sendero in specific circumstances and under narrow
constraints, are of limited utility when applied to the
Shining Path and Peru as a whole. First, other than the
resource mobilization theories, they only explain Sendero'
s
"Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," World
Politics Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1984): 48-84.
•- 4The ELN, or the Army of National Liberation, was an offshoot
of the Peruvian Communists whose foco in 1965 originated in
Ayacucho. It was defeated by government forces within 6 months.
Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 18.
-Ibid. , 136 and 248.
'-'Ibid., 250-258. These are but a few of the theories of
revolution used to analyze Latin American insurgencies. For a
review of these theories, see Susan Eckstein, "Power and Popular
Protest in Latin America," in Susan Eckstein, ed . , Power and
Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989), 1-54.
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success in Ayacucho or the southern highlands, thus failing to
address the organization's success elsewhere in Peru.
Further, I would contend that the above theories are but
symptoms of a greater feature of Peruvian society which must
be understood to appreciate why they apply to Peru, and to
fully understand why Peru was and is vulnerable to insurgency.
One must first examine Peru from a higher level of
analysis; one must understand the fundamentally divided nature
of Peruvian society. This thesis will argue that this central
social fabric of Peruvian society makes it highly vulnerable
to the rise of revolution. Beyond that, this chapter will
analyze two state-centered phenomena and a brief analysis of
the impact of previous economic divisions related to Peru's
divided nature that, I contend, made and continue to make Peru
vulnerable to revolution. These phenomena are:
1. The lack of effectiveness and efficacy needed for a
regime to gain the legitimacy necessary to preclude to
spread of a revolutionary movement.
2
.
Within Peru there is an extraordinary amount of
political space within which the Shining Path was
conceived, its message proselytized and spread, and the
initial phases of the revolution fought.
While Peru's divided nature is, in my view, its primary
vulnerability to revolution, I would contend that the vast
political space left unfilled by the government is the
phenomenon that left Peru vulnerable to a highly structured
and hierarchical revolutionary organization.
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Clearly economic conditions, while arguably not a
significant contributor to the creation of the Shining Path,
are a powerful factor in influencing the organization's
continued strength and breadth of support. 127 This thesis
will not address the economic aspect except as it impacts or
is influenced by Peru's divisions. This is for two basic
reasons. To adequately address the economics that have
assisted the Shining Path's growth would require an extensive
historical and analytical examination of Peru's various
economic programs, including their impact on the different
economic and ethnic factions of society. That daunting task
would best be attempted in an economically focused paper.
Second, as I hope to demonstrate, the issue of economic
development is only one aspect of and is subsumed within the
divided nature of Peruvian society.
A. THE TWO NATIONS OF PERU
Peru has been a dualistic society since Lima served as the
capital of the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru in the 16th and
17th centuries. In the colonial years, Spaniards used the
indigenous Indians as slave labor in the mines and on the
haciendas . This is the foundation of today's Peru, which
still "... confronts the heritage of a conquest culture: an
LJ/For an overall sense of Peruvian economic performance as it
relates to the rise of the Shining Path, see Palmer, 130, and
McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 38-39.
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ethnically diverse population stratified along lines of deep-
seated inequality ." i_: Despite the passage of over 400
years, Peru remains divided ethnically, linguistically,
economically, and geographically, much as the Peru described
by Mariategui in the 1920s. 1 -' Taken together, these
interrelated divisions have worked to ensure that, on a
general level, the largely white and mestizo elites of Lima
have little to do with the mestizo and Indian of the sierra.
This has left the typical resident of the sierra with few ties
to either Lima or to the State of Peru, created deep
resentments, and spawned a situation fertile for cultivation
by a group such as the Shining Path. These divisions are
closely linked. I will, however, attempt to illustrate each
individually to highlight the scope of the chasm between the
two Perus ; their related properties should be evident.
1. Ethnic and Linguistic Divisions
Despite the passage of several centuries and Velasco's
reforms, Peru remains largely divided along ethnic lines.
After conquering the Incas in the 16th century, the Spanish
remained in western South America in large part due to the
--Patricia Kluck, "The Society and its Environment," in
Richard F. Nyrop, ed . , Peru: A Country Study (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 61.
'•-'See Jose Carlos Mariategui, Seven Interpretive Essays on
Peruvian Reality (Austin, TX : University of Texas Press, 1971).
mineral resources and landholdings in the region. Those
persons of European descent still dominate Peru today,
politically, socially, and economically. On the political
scene, Peru is dominated by whites and mestizos that were
either born into or have been able to make the transition into
Peru's elite class. - : The military still plays a major role
in Peruvian politics, and shares the racial bent of the upper
and middle classes, as well as their ethnic biases.'
In contrast to the white and mestizo elites, the
Peruvians of Indian descent are considered and treated as
those lowest on the socioeconomic scale. :i ~ According to
Kluck, being Indian traditionally meant being controlled by
whites or mestizos.- This ethnic divide has led to such
racism that problems, such as the Shining Path, are not
considered to be important until they affect the cities, and
''See Kluck, p. 70-73. She points out that the lines between
white, mestizo
,
and indian have blurred considerably; often the
difference, especially between mestizos and mdians, is based on
class rather than a strict ethnic criteria. However, what is
important for the purposes of this paper is how the individuals of
each group perceive themselves, not necessarily the factual or
nonfactual basis behind the perceptions. As Kluck writes, "To say
someone is white is to attribute elite status to that person."
[;1McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 33.
While the enlisted ranks include mestizos and Indians, the officer
corps is predominantly white.
'-Kluck cites a sierra saying "The Indian is the animal
closest to man." p. 73. SALA Volume 28, table 658, p. 144





thus, the elites. This could in part explain the slow
response of Fernando Belaunde's administration (1980-1985) to
Sendero's rise in the early 1980s in the overwhelmingly Indian
regions of the country."' 4
Closely related to the ethnic divide is the division
based on language. Spanish is the primary language, spoken by
the whites and mestizos, while Quechua and Aymara are spoken
by the indians . While Indians may be bilingual and speak
Spanish, few whites or mestizos speak Quechua or Aymara. 135




Economically, whites dominate the ranks of the upper
class. A recent socioeconomic study divided Peru into four
broad income groups (labeled from A to D, with A the highest
income group and D the lowest), and found that the number of
li4Belaunde did not declare a state of emergency in certain
provinces of Ayacucho department until late 1982, over two years
after Sendero began the armed campaign. Palmer, 13 9. Henry Dietz
describes Belaunde's ineffectual response to Sendero, particularly
his lack of interest in addressing long-term social problems in
Ayacucho. Henry Dietz, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Revolutionary
Movement," Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol. 18
(Summer 1990) : 138.
13?As with ethnicity, lines of distinction are complex. What
distinguishes mestizo from Indian is the knowledge of Spanish/lack
of knowledge of Quechua or Aymara. Once again, the perception is
more powerful than reality. To be thought of as Indian is to be
thought of as inferior.
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people included in the top income group accounted for only 1.8
percent of Peru's population, and includes executives,
businessmen, and independent professionals. The study states
that "Those who are in this category are generally of the
white race, born in Lima, and have attended university."
Further, over 88 percent of the population belongs in the
bottom two income groups; those in group C are typically
mestizos and Indians, while those in the lowest income group
are predominantly Indian. This report highlights two of the
key divides in Peru: first, as previously shown, the status
of Peruvian whites compared to other ethnic groups; secondly,
the small size of the middle class. This study shows that in
general, Peruvians are either very well off or poor, further
illustrating the economic divisions of the State. 13 ' Other
studies have confirmed the extreme concentration of wealth in
Peru. According to one such study conducted in 1985, the top
10 percent of the population earned just slightly less than
the bottom 70 percent of the population
.
li/
The economic division bleeds over into the land tenure
question, an issue of great importance to the Andean peasant.
The question of land tenure was important to General Juan
'The study, conducted by APOYO, in Peru Economico, Feb 92,
cited in FBIS-LAT-92 -062 , 31 March 92, p. 27.
1; In 1985-86, income distribution data in Peru showed that the
top decile commanded 35.4 percent of the economic pie, while the
bottom 70 percent controlled 36.9 percent. A. Javier Hamann and
Carlos E. Paredes, "The Peruvian Economy: Characteristics and
Trends," in Paredes and Sachs, eds
.
, Peru's Path to Recovery, 54.
81
Velasco's reformist military regime (1968-1975), and his
agenda to address the issue was vast. The objectives of his
1969 land reform included the replacement of the latifundio
and minifundio''"'-
,
the creation of a new agrarian order, the
guarantee of social justice, redistribution of income, and job
security for the campesino . This was to be done through land
expropriation and transfer. 1
Despite the noteworthy achievements of the Velasco
administration, the vast majority of the population did not
benefit from his land reform programs. Much of the land
expropriated was not redistributed to the indian communities,
but rather was given to the former tenants of the seized
haciendas , which were later turned into cooperatives. 140
Less than one-third of the rural families benefitted from the
agrarian reform programs/ 41 While this was the most
The Latifundia System was a pattern of land ownership in
which large-scale plantations were owned by local gentry, absentee
landlords, and corporations. The Minifundia System was an
agriculture system consisting of small farms. Ernest Rossi and
Jack C. Piano, The Latin American Political Dictionary (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1980), 12 and 15.
"Peter S. Cleaves and Martin J. Scurrah, Agriculture,
Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1980), 261.
M Daniel M. Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin
America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 254.
:41 The data on this issue are somewhat inconsistent. As
previously noted, McClintock, Peasant Cooperatives and Political
Change in Peru, p. 61 reports that 356,276 families, or 24 percent
benefitted from land reform. SALA Vol. 28 table 309, p. 52
reports that 431,982 families, or 30.4 percent benefitted from land
reform. Either way, well over two-thirds did not benefit.
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successful and aggressive program in Latin America (save
Cuba)
,
it still excluded a large percentage of the population,
especially the landless temporary workers. 14 " While land
tenure may not be very important in a modern post -industrial
society, its importance is still substantial in a society
that, despite recent urbanization, remains heavily rural and
thus tied to the land.*"'
3 . Geographic Divisions
Perhaps none of Peru's divisions is as important as
the geographic one, as it helps maintain the other chasms in
Peruvian society. The divide in Peru is primarily between the
coastal plains and the interior. However, that divide has
become symbolized as the divide between the capital city and
the sierra. Lima is the center of Peru, and has in many ways
become a city-state. 144 It now contains approximately one-
third of the country's population, and is the center of
political, economic, and social life, despite its small
geographic size in comparison to the rest of the State. 14 "
' 4_McClintock, Peasant Cooperatives, 63.
14;Much of Peru's urbanization has taken place because of
warfare and poverty in the highlands; such migration to the cities
can hardly be considered voluntary.
• 44McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities, 2.
14
-'The population of Lima is difficult to pinpoint, as it grows
continuously due to the mass immigration from those fleeing
violence in the highlands. Based on a the 1988 population estimate
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Yet its location isolates it from most of the State's land
mass, and the difficulty of movement into the interior has
isolated Lima culturally and socially from a large portion of
its indigenous populat ion . l4 ' Mariategui's views of the
chasm between Lima and the interior are that coastal Peru,
while strong enough to maintain quasi control over the
interior, cannot maintain true control. To Mariategui, Lima
and the coast, while in Peru, are not of Peru.
The Peru of the coast, heir of Spain and the conquest,
controls the Peru of the sierra from Lima; but it is not
demographically and spiritually strong enough to absorb
it . . . . Lima, . . . has had a somewhat arbitrary beginning.
Founded by the conquistador, a foreigner, Lima appears to
have originated as the military tent of a commander from
some distant land... The creation of an aristocratic age,
Lima was born into nobility and was baptized City of
Kings. It was created by the colonizer, or rather, the
conquistador, not by the native.' 4
of 21.26 million people, Lima would contain roughly seven million
inhabitants. The importance of Lima is illustrated when one
compares its population to the next largest cities in Peru.
Estimates from 1985 put the population of Lima at 5,008,400; the
next largest cities were Arequipa with 545,165 and Callao with
515,200. Since Callao is virtually a geographic appendage of Lima,
the importance of Lima is even further magnified. Figures taken
from SALA 28, tables 618 and 635, pp. 118 and 131.
14Tima was isolated culturally and socially at least until the
recent forced exodus into the cities by those serranos fleeing the
violence of the countryside. Still, most of the white elite of
Lima remains separated from the Indians of the pueblos jovenes .
Even today, the road network from the coastal centers into the
interior is very limited.
^Mariategui , 164 and 176.
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This isolation provided much "virgin soil" that Sendero was
able to cultivate politically, without the countervailing
forces of governmental political socialization. '"
4 . Conclusion
Any one of the ethnic, linguistic, economic, or
geographic divisions described above are counterproductive to
the establishment of a nation. When all are added together,
their synergistic effects exceed the sum of their individual
parts. Comparing a Spanish-speaking white coastal elite with
a poverty stricken Quechua-speakmg Indian from the highlands
is a comparison of two mutually exclusive groups. When one
adds in the standard white disdain for Indians with that
Indian's wherent distrust for outsiders one finds little to no
commonality and an exceedingly difficult task in creating any
common ground. Thus, one can view the rise of Sendero as a
reflection of unresolved conflicts between Lima and the
interior, with a significant ethnic component mixed with this
regional conflict. 14 " As Degregori noted,
- 4
'See Wickham-Crowley , Guerrillas and Revolution, 151 and 251,
and McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 18 for
further discussion. Sendero ' s strategy has been to create a vacuum
where necessary; Guzman speaks of this in Interview with Chairman
Gonzalo, 34 and 36.
141Susan C. Bourque and Kay B. Warren, "Democracy Without
Peace: The Cultural Politics of Terror in Peru," Latin American
Research Review Vol. 24, No. 1 (1989): 15.
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It is clear that the spinal column of Sendero is drawn
from one group. They are young men, from the
provinces instead of the capital, from the mountains
instead of the coast, mestizo or cholo, and more
educated than the ordinary population. So, for the
State, anyone who fits this description is a
Senderista. Whites see indians from the provinces and
they are afraid."
The Shining Path has worked hard to exploit these
chasms and fears of Peruvians . In a recent interview, a
leading Shining Path representative stated that "...I have
perceived the need for a democratic revolution, an antifeudal
revolution so Peru can stop being a colonial country, a
country that is managed by persons of foreign descent-- in
other words Spaniards ...."' l
The chasm is further accentuated when one combines the
ethnic, geographic, and economic divides. Peru has long
participated in the world economy through the export of its
resources, from guano to copper to fish products. Probably
because of this, Peru has invested primarily in sectors and
projects that enhance the export market, meaning that Peru has
invested heavily in the mineral economy and the coastal
ports--and not in the subsistence agriculture of the sierra
that would benefit the Andean peasant. This has furthered
Quoted by Eugene Robinson, "Racial Strife Fuels Peru's Rebel
War," Washington Post, 4 March 90, cited in Dietz, 135.
"
:FBIS-LAT-91-203, 21 Oct 91, p. 42, referencing an Expreso,
13 Oct 91 interview with Adolfo Olaechea, Shining Path
representative in London.
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alienation due to the geographic divisions, and increased the
disparity of income distribution. As Albert Berry writes,
The main implication of the last 100 years' experience is
that a Peruvian-type primary export model is consistent
with extreme levels of inequality, and thus such a
strategy cannot be counted on to reduce significantly the
income gap between rich and poor.-
-
While the above-cited research specifically addresses
the export sector of Peru's economy, other research has shown
that regardless of the stated reason, Peru has invested the
vast majority of its public investment in the coastal regions.
Table 1 demonstrates the degree to which Peru has concentrated
on the development of the coast, even during the Velasco
administration, which is often lauded for its attempts to
further the plight of the peasant.
1
-"Albert Berry, "International Trade, Government, and Income
Distribution in Peru since 1870," Latin American Research Review
Vol. 25, No. 2 (1990) : 54.
87
TABLE 1, PERU, INVESTMENT BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION
Sector or Region 1968-75 1976-79 1968-80 1981-82
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Productive Sector
Coast 71.3 65.0 68.0 50.5
Sierra 1.5 4.8 3.0 34.8
Jungle 8.0 15.7 11.3 14.0
Multidepartmental 19.2 14.5 17.6 .6
%age of total 52.0 59.5 55.4 30.5
Economic
Infras t rue t u r e
Coast 4 6 4 3 5 . 41 .9 51 .4
Sierra 18 4 2 I 20 .3 27 .5
Jungle 16 5 18 .3 17 .1 11 .4
Mult idepartmental 18 6 23 . 2 20 .7 9 .7
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Source: Patricia A. Wilson and Carol Wise, "The Regional
Implications of Public Investment: in Peru, 1968-1983"
Latin American Research Review Vol. 21 No. 2 (1986) :
100. -'
By "productive sector" the authors refer to the major
currency-producing industries such as oil, mining, and large-scale
agriculture; "economic infrastructure," refers to transportation,
communications, and electricity generation projects; "social
infrastructure" refers to education, health, and housing. Ibid.,
99.
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Wilson and Wise write, "During the three major political
phases since 1968, the national government has not used the
public investment program as a means for correcting the vast
interregional disparities in the distribution of national
income." The various administrations may have had
legitimate reasons for such a public investment pattern;
although one can perhaps understand the weightings in the
"Productive Sector" and "Economic Infrastructure" sectors, it
is more difficult to understand the vast spending on "Social
Infrastructure" in the coastal regions relative to the
interior. Nevertheless, the white, elite-dominated government
enhanced the status and prosperity of the coastal regions
relative to the sierra and the jungle, despite pressing needs
in the interior, further adding to the disparities and thus
the chasm between the two Peruvian nations.
Finally, reinforcing the data on investment patterns,
the distribution of income follows the pattern of an economic
and geographic divide within Peru. As previously mentioned,
the top 10 percent of the population consumes over 35 percent
of the State's total consumption. 1 This same study also
cites a high correlation between income distribution and the
geographic distribution of the population. In the mid-1980s,











in rural areas, five of those in the sierra. Only six percent
of the poorest 20 percent lived in Lima. ;r ' The same pattern
holds for the affluent sector, with only 18 percent of the top
20 percent living in rural areas, while almost half of the top




B. ROLE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
While Peru's inability to function as a nation has been
the primary cause of its susceptibility to revolution, State
and political institutions have contributed to that
susceptibility. As Theda Skocpol writes, state structures and
political conditions, to include state relations with society,
are important facets of susceptibility to revolution. 1 ^
Although subsequent structuralist models do not predict
success for Sendero's revolution, 1 "' conditions of State
machinery and political circumstances contributed greatly to
"'This number has likely increased as peasants flee the
violence in the countryside for the pueblos jovenes that ring Lima.
r7





^See Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979) .
;r
'Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in
the Contemporary Third World," Politics & Society Vol. 17, No. 4
(1989): 489-509. According to the model argued in their article,
neo-patrimonial dictatorships and directly ruled colonial regimes
are most vulnerable to revolution.
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the emergence and rise of the Shining Path. This thesis
argues that two distinct but interrelated aspects of the State
allowed and contributed to the rise of the Shining Path.
First, the State has not been able to function as an efficient
and efficacious regime, a condition which limits its
legitimacy and makes segments of the populace receptive to
alternative messages. That lack of legitimacy leaves those
citizens unattracted to Sendero's message without a political
alternative to which they can turn. Second, the State allowed
a vast political space to exist that first allowed the
movement to ferment, and then permitted the Shining Path to
spread its message and build its organizational structure
without a valid countervailing message from or suppression by
the government
.
1. Efficacy and Effectiveness
Juan J. Linz, theorizing about the breakdown of
democratic regimes, writes that, over the course of time,
efficacy and effectiveness can strengthen, reinforce,
maintain, or weaken society's belief in regime legitimacy. 1 ' 1
By efficacy Linz means the capacity of a regime to find
solutions to problems; effectiveness refers to the capacity to
actually implement the policies formulated, and with the
:
""Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes : Crisis,
Breakdown, & Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1978) , 18.
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desired results. 101 If a regime has a record of efficacy and
effectiveness it can build a reservoir of legitimacy with its
people, from which it can draw in times of want or other
problems . -' -
The Peruvian government has not been an efficacious or
an effective regime from the standpoint of the Peruvian
people. Peruvians have had to tolerate, over the course of 12
years of democratic rule, three vastly different economic
programs, two of which were abject failures (it is still too
early to pass judgment on President Fujimori's economic
plan) . l,y>
The marginally orthodox plan of President Belaunde in
the early 1980s left the economy in a state of negative
economic growth. His privatization plan was too grandiose for
the resources available, and trade liberalization was
ultimately overturned. The public investment plan, in the
absence of cuts in government spending, resulted in growing
budget deficits and rising inflation. 1 ' 4 Belaunde, despite
u,1 Ibid.
,
20 and 22 .
1,J
-Ibid., 21.
""For two reviews of Peru's economic programs under the
Belaunde administration, see Catherine M. Conaghan, James M.
Malloy, and Luis A. Abugattas, "Business and the 'Boys': The
Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes," Latin American
Research Review Vol. 25, No. 2 (1990): 3-30. Also, Manuel Pastor,
Jr. and Carol Wise, "Peruvian Economic Policy in the 1980s: From
Orthodoxy to Heterodoxy and Back, " Latin American Research Review
Vol. 27, No. 2 (1992): 83-117.
lL,4Conaghan et . al . , 16.
92
his professed dedication to economic orthodoxy, failed to
follow the orthodox model when difficulties arose, and his
backpedalmg midway through the program led to disaster.
Foreign reserves were dissipated, export prices fell, and
domestic inflation rose rapidly as government spending
continued to rise in the face of eroding governmental
taxation.- Ultimately, Belaunde's "truncated
liberalization" saw per capita GDP fall an average of 3.9
percent per year from 1980 to 1985. l! Clearly, Belaunde's
brand of limited dedication to orthodoxy was not the answer
for Peru's economic ills, and constituted a major failure of
the central government to establish legitimacy.
The economic programs of the Garcia administration,
while very different from those of the Belaunde
administration, also failed to establish the requisite
efficacy and effectiveness of the government. After an
initially encouraging beginning, Garcia's "heterodox" policies
turned out to produce, in the end, a far worse economic
situation than was inherited in 1985. •'
' Ibid.
Hamann and Paredes, 71.
'"For a review of the economic goals, methods, and results
achieved under the Garcia administration, see Pastor and Wise, and
Arthur J. Mann and Manuel Pastor, Jr., "Orthodox and Heterodox
Stabilization Policies in Bolivia and Peru: 1985-1988," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter
1989) : 163-191.
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Initially, Garcia 's populist economic program appeared
to be successful. Peru ended 1986 with the highest growth
rate in Latin America, made significant progress in calming
inflation, and boosted real wages.-" However, the
government failed to confront the fiscal and balance of
payments crises that created the above mentioned gains.
Peru's heterodox system, in exchange for significant (and
ultimately fleeting) benefits for its workers, bankrupted the
treasury and set the stage for deep recession and
hyperinflation later in Garcia' s administration. Table 2
depicts some of the causes of Peru's precipitous economic
decline, as well as the results of those policies.
'
-GDP grew by 8.7 percent in 1986 and inflation fell from
158.3 percent in 1985 to 62.9 percent in 1986. Real wages, after
falling by 15.2 percent in 1985, rose by 30.4 percent in 1986.
United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 1989
(Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 1991), 581 and 583.
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TABLE 2, PERU, ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1985-1989
Indicator 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
GDP (base year 1979)
Change in real terms 2.3 9.2 8.5 -7.9 -11.3
Change in consumption 4 .2 9.6 11.1 -6.2 -19.9
Change in investment -15.0 31.4 15.6 -13 .3 -19.4
Inf lat ion 158. •; 62 .9 114.5 1722 2775
Current account 12 5 -1079 -1477 -1079 52 2
Nonfinancial public 2 .7 5.2 6.6 7 .5 5.6
sector deficit (% GDP)
Tax collection (% GDP) 14.3 12 .0 9.1 9 .2 5.9
Changes in real wages -16.3 23 .5 9.6 -15.8 -46.3
Change in employment _ 1 "3 6 . 7 .8 -1.5 -10.9
Source: Paredes and Sachs, eds
.
,
Peru ' s Path to Recovery
table 2-1, p. 85.
Thus, on the economic front, Peru's reintroduct ion to
democracy in the 1980s also initiated and demonstrated, at
least with regards to the economy, two governments incapable
of formulating sound economic policies. The Belaunde and
Garcia administrations did tint demonstrate the requisite
economic efficacy or effectiveness needed to gain legitimacy,
a failure that I would contend made and makes the Shining Path
a more viable option to many Peruvians than it would be under
legitimized government.
The inability to demonstrate efficacy and
effectiveness does not end with economic policy and
performance, and much evidence is seen in the regime's
inability to competently prosecute a counterinsurgency
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campaign against the Shining Path. At first, President
Belaunde was reluctant to address the insurgency. SL's open
campaign began in May 1980, but the government downplayed the
threat, not responding with a major counterinsurgency campaign
until December 1982-January 1983. l Belaunde 's reluctance
was crucial for what it allowed and what it demonstrated. It
gave the Shining Path crucial breathing space within which to
operate during the infancy of its campaign, precisely at the
time when a revolutionary organization is most vulnerable to
governmental counterinsurgency assaults. Further, Belaunde 's
slow response again demonstrated that, despite the passage of
400 years and the supposed advances gained by Indians and
peasants during the Velasco years, the white, urban government
of Lima was not attenuated to or even interested in conditions
of the countryside. The initial lack of response to SL's
rural campaign in Ayacucho again demonstrated both a lack of
regime efficacy and effectiveness in addressing the concerns
of the countryside.
When Belaunde finally reacted to the Shining Path, his
counterinsurgency revolved around a military response,
ignoring the conditions that gave Sendero the ability to
operate. The military's response was, as mentioned in an
earlier chapter, seen as indiscriminate, violating standards
170Cynthia McClintock, "Peru: Precarious Regimes,
Authoritarian and Democrat," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and
Seymour Martin Lipset, eds
.
, Democracy in Developing Areas: Latin
America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989): 366.
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of human rights, and leaving the citizens caught between
Sendero and government violence, giving them no legitimate
alternative to SL. 1?1 Further, from a purely military
standpoint, the counterinsurgency campaigns were poorly
conceived, poorly executed, frustrated by an inferior
intelligence capability, and cursed with inferior leadership
that, at least in the initial stages, did not understand the
nature of its foe.' 7 "
The Garcia response to the insurgency was not much
better than Belaunde's, and in fact continued the previous
administration's emphasis on military responses at the expense
of long term civic actions. Human rights violations by the
government continued, again denying the population a
legitimate alternative to the Shining Path. Such actions, as
evidenced by the lack of success in prosecuting the
counterinsurgency and continued widespread peasant distrust of
governmental authority, indicate a lack of efficacy in
planning a counterinsurgency campaign, a lack of effectiveness
in delivering goods to the interior, and an inability to act
as a legitimate authority for the Indians of the interior.
mFor one view of human rights conditions in Peru, see
Americas Watch, Peru Under Fire (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992) .
:7jFor an assessment of the counterinsurgency campaign from a
military perspective, see Mauceri, "Military Politics and Counter-
insurgency in Peru," 83-109.
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2. Political Space and "Virgin Soil"
A second factor crucial to Sendero's rise was the
existence, again linked to Peru's status as a divided entity,
of an enormous amount of political space within which to
organize, and, concurrently, the existence of much "virgin
soil" open for SL recruitment. This thesis takes the concept
of political space and applies it as a derivative of the
concept of geopolitical vision. "Virgin soil" includes not
only tangible geographic features, such as the Peruvian
highlands, but more importantly, the virgin political
consciousness of people's minds, uncultivated by the State.
a. The Internal Application of Geopolitics
One factor that has contributed to the rise and
spread of the Shining Path that has not been adequately
explored has been Peru's lack of an appropriate geopolitical
vision. This deficiency would likely be considered a
manifestation of the previously mentioned geographic divide,
although because it also has roots in Peru's ethnic and
linguistic split this lack of vision is in reality a concrete
example of the occasionally abstract concept of a nation
divided. In the context of this rural-based insurgency, Peru's
deficiency is the failure to fully occupy its own national
territory. Jack Child articulated this concept, writing
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The first current concerns the purely internal aspects
of geopolitical thinking, which stresses that a nation
must fully and effectively occupy its own national
territory in order to maximize the opportunities that
its geographic position and resources permit... if
carried out intelligently, it can make a contribution
toward national development and general progress
While Child was writing of internal measures to
provide security from threats beyond one's borders, I would
alter this concept for application to internal security
against internal threats. Thus, this concept would be
modified to state that a nation must fully and effectively
occupy its own territory to ensure its own security. This is
necessary for a government to be aware of the political and
social situation within its own borders, and to perform the
task of political socialization (to till the "virgin soil") of
its citizens. Note that military forces are not required to
carry out these requirements; these are merely functions that
most governments perform, and must perform in order to be an
effective body.
In the case of Peru, the central authorities
fulfilled neither of these conditions, a fact that has been
recognized by other analysts as well. 1 ' 4 First, as is now
"Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America:
Quarrels Among Neighbors (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985) , 12.
4Woy-Hazelton and Hazelton write, "Sendero's ability to
expand geographically and numerically in 10 years is more a
reflection of the failure to integrate vast areas of the Andean
highlands than any real appeal of the Senderista message." Sandra
Woy-Hazelton and William A. Hazelton, "Sendero Lummoso and the
Future of Peruvian Democracy, " Third World Quarterly Vol. 12 (April
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well known, Abimael Guzman was able to use the University of
Huamanga in Ayacucho as a base to proselytize, which he did
until going underground in 1978. 1 The fact that such an
ideology was spread openly for many years is testament to a
lack of central authority. Secondly, the government failed to
perform the task of political socialization, of tilling the
"virgin soil" of its people, as is in part demonstrated by the
receptivity of the students to Guzman's message.' While
poverty enhanced the message's appeal, the fact that it was
conveyed without an effective countervailing message
contributed to Guzman's ability to recruit into his movement.
In fact, Guzman's disciples fulfilled the role normally
reserved for the State, as they fanned out into the highlands
and provided those services neglected by the State.'
Why was this allowed to occur? The answer goes
back to the divide within Peru. Events in the Indian-
dominated highlands were of little concern to the elites of
Lima. Due to governmental neglect, Ayacucho and other
highland departments were "virgin soil" for Guzman and his
1990) : 33 .
1?r
'Cynthia McClintock, "Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist
Guerrillas," Problems of Communism Vol . 32 (Sep-Oct 1983): 20-21.
i,DMcCormick writes, "The young, according to Sendero, have
little or no political past and are open to the wisdom of Comrade
Gonzalo. They do not have to be reeducated, only educated."
McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru, 13.
177Woy-Hazelton and Hazelton, 22
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followers to harvest. This continued to present Sendero
opportunities as it established rural base areas to facilitate
expansion throughout Peru. As McCormick writes, "The
establishment of such a basing structure, according to Guzman,
has been made possible by 'a vacuum of power in the
countryside, ' a result of both the underdeveloped political
infrastructure of the regime and the actions of the Shining
Path. " r:'
The existence of political space is critical for
the formation of a highly organized revolutionary organization
such as the Shining Path. In his book The Moral Economy of
the Peasant, James Scott writes of rebellion as a defensive,
"last gasp" move by peasants confronted by threats to their
subsistence. Actions like these, such as the bread line riots
that preceeded the Russian Revolution in 1917, are less
dependent upon political space due to their relative
spontaneity. Revolutions such as Mao's in China, Vietnam of
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and Peru of the 1980s and early
1990s are more dependent upon space provided by the
established authorities. That is because highly organized
movements are dependent upon proselyt ization, recruitment, and
organization building, actions that require time (the
certainly are not spontaneous) and are difficult to conduct in
complete secrecy.
173McCormick, From the Sierra to the Cities, 17
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Guzman's activities at the University of Huamanga
in the 1970s, his disciples' victories in student elections,
and so forth were not carried out clandestinely, and were well
known in the region. The government, while perhaps aware of
Guzman's activities, did nothing to contain or mitigate the
message, allowing it to build and grow without facing
governmental repression. Such conditions inevitably helped
Guzman and his deputies in designing and implementing a system
that has proven, once constructed, highly resistant to
governmental repression and suppression.
C. ECONOMIC IMPACT
Peru's economic performance has been well documented. It
has been beset by high inflation, negative economic growth,
and a growing sense of despair on the part of the poor
segments of the population. However, several points need to
be highlighted. An examination of overall economic growth is
not an accurate measurement of whether the typical citizen's
situation is improving, as evidenced by food riots and an
aborted coup in Venezuela during a time of remarkably high
economic growth. :7Q As previously mentioned, Peru is
dominated by Lima and the coastal industries that support the
^'Tim Golden, "Democracy Isn't Always Enough," New York Times,
9 Feb 92. Venezuela's economy was growing at a 9.2 percent annual
rate prior to the coup attempt in February 1992.
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export market; their success has little short-term effect on
the peasants of the highlands.
A better measure of economic performance as it relates to
the average citizen are measures that relate to sustenance.
On those grounds, Peru is and has been slipping. Table 3
demonstrates by measures of food production and nutrition that
Peru has not only failed to better the lot of its people, but
that their situation has declined since the 1960s.
TABLE 3, PERU, NUTRITION AND FOOD PRODUCTION STATISTICS
Daily C
Intake






1961-63 2227 60 .9
1969-71 2289 61 .1
1975-77 2209 56 •—i. / 118.3 (in 1976)
1979-81 2166 57 .2 100
1980-82 2141 58 .6
1981-83 2150 58 -i
1983-85 2144 5 6 . 8





28, tables 820, 821, and 827
Another issue is the means by which countries are now
attempting to revive their economies. Most have embraced the
harsh anti-inflation message of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) , which is likely a good prescription for long-term
economic success. While growth may over time raise the
standard of living for the average peasant, the economic
programs imposed in countries such as Venezuela, Peru, and
l«i ,
Bolivia often hits hardest those least able to tolerate
additional austerity. These measures, in Peru's case, while
perhaps for the overall good of the economy as a whole,
impacts heavily on the poor, and hands the Shining Path an
issue around which to mobilize the populace. President
Fujimori is thus confronted with a "Catch-22;" if he
implements IMF-style austerity measures, he drives a segment
of the populace towards Sendero. On the other hand, he can
attempt to address the social and economic ills exploited by
the Shining Path while his economy deteriorates from
inflation, a lack of international financing, a bloated public
sector, and other economic ills. Policies of past
administrations presented President Fujimori with a situation
in which he is "damned if he does, damned if he doesn't."
D. CONCLUSION
Peru still maintains much of the legacy of colonialism in
the ways its people are divided by language, ethnicity,
geography, and class. These chasms in society are, I contend,
the primary vulnerability that the Shining Path exploits when
waging war with the State, for all other vulnerabilities can
be subsumed under this heading. These divides are obvious to
the Peruvian citizenry, and the resentments of the
disenfranchised play into the hands of the revolution. These
divides should not be insurmountable, but the internal war
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makes addressing such core, longstanding issues extremely
difficult .
From the standpoint of the elite, the segment of the
population that should be brought into the system is or could
be seen as the enemy, due to their preponderance in the
Shining Path, making their incorporation highly problematic.
This perception is particularly troublesome if held by the
military, as governmental repression based solely on race,
language, age, and gender will drive the contested audience
into the arms of the enemy. From the standpoint of the poor,
elite unwillingness to share power or economic success, based
on the above considerations, would validate the "unfairness"
of society and conspire to drive that segment of the
population toward Sendero. Even if they do not turn to the
Shining Path, the dispossessed elements of the population
would be even less likely to provide even passive support to
the State as it attempts to conduct the countermsurgency
.
1:''
The State structures also addressed in this chapter, while
evidence of the divides mentioned above, have contributed
specifically to SL's rise. While I in no way contend that
these structural deficiencies are the root cause of Sendero'
s
campaign, I do contend that they were the springboard from
which Sendero launched its campaign. A key lesson to be
1:,
"For a theoretical analysis of the varying levels of support
desired and required by a revolutionary movement, see Leites and
Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 8-16.
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learned from this section is that a state, particularly one in
a tenuous position, must occupy the political space and fill
the "virgin soil" in its citizen's political experience. A
government must be able to detect threats to the established
order if it is to remain in power. This is not a profound
discovery, for states throughout the world perform these
functions regularly. A prime state function is to politically
socialize its population, and if it fails to accomplish that
task someone or something is likely to fill that void. Peru
did not fulfill its governmental obligations, leaving space
for an organization such as the Shining Path to do the job
itself-- to the obvious detriment of the State.
The main question of this thesis regards the future of the
Shining Path in the post-Guzman era, and whether the
organization will be able to adapt to the loss of its leader.
One step the government can take, as was mentioned in the
previous chapter, is to alleviate the conditions that allowed
for the rise of the Shining Path in the first place. If this
is done, SL's future will be limited even if it is able to
address the loss of its spiritual leader.
However, the Peruvian government does not seem to be
pushing Peru from being a State towards becoming a nation-
state in the true sense of the word. Ethnic, geographic,
linguistic, and economic fragmentation is still the rule, not
the exception. Further, the government does not seem
interested in truly extending its control into the
106
countryside, as evidenced by the creation of the rondas
campesinas , a tacit admittance of its incapacity to rule
beyond Lima and perhaps the department capitals
.
The government is aggressively addressing the economic
troubles. Thus far, however, their responses, while perhaps
sound from a strictly economic standpoint, are causing
hardship precisely in the population to which Sendero is most
popular. Guzman's capture will probably give the government
a short-term respite whereby it can attempt to address the
long-standing economic troubles facing Peru. However, the
government's chosen economic recovery plan is fundamentally
dependent upon containing and limiting the insurgency. A key
aspect of Peru's orthodox plan is the need for foreign
investment capital. Foreign investors are not likely to
invest heavily in Peru unless they have confidence in the
long-term stability of the country, something they are not
likely to receive soley from the apprehension of Guzman.
The long term stability of Peru is dependent upon
addressing the other vulnerabilities identified in this
chapter, and the government is not moving to address the
aspects of society that, I contend, makes Peru vulnerable to
revolution in general and vulnerable to a group such as the
Shining Path in particular. Addressing the structures of
society are the type of aggressive steps that can, in a long-
term sense, thwart the resurgence of the Shining Path. Thus
far, the government is not taking those kinds of steps.
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V. CONCLUSION
This thesis opened by offering three possible scenarios
for the future of the Shining Path in a post-Guzman
environment. Regardless of the outcome of the issue, clearly
that outcome will be in large part predicated upon the
organization's ability to adapt to Guzman's loss, particularly
if the government proves unable to follow the Guzman capture
with other counterinsurgency successes.
The thesis thus examined the Shining Path's campaign for
evidence of flexibility at the ideological, strategic, and
tactical levels in varying operational environments. The
evidence demonstrates that the organization is highly
flexible, adapting its message and tactics to suit the
particular targeted community. Sendero does this by employing
a flexible approach to inducements, employing various
inducements and differential levels of persuasion and coercion
that are dictated by the targeted community and its
receptivity to SL. The thesis also examined how Sendero is
able to establish bases of support through the framework of a
social contract, including the provisal of security, economic
necessities, and psychological needs. Following this analysis
of Sendero methods, the thesis examined case studies from
disparate regions of Peru to give concrete examples of how the
Shining Path in fact uses inducements. The most impressive
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example of SL flexibility is its campaign in the Upper
Huallaga Valley where the organization uses coordinated
strategies to thwart the government, the Colombian drug
cartels, and the MRTA, often playing off one actor against the
other
.
The thesis then addresser! the issue of how Sendero
attempts to appeal to the many constituencies that make up any
targeted community, finding that Sendero uses the
contradictions inherent in society to appeal to several groups
whose membership crosses class lines. Thus, to portray the
Shining Path as a group that appeals only to the poor is
incorrect, a portrayal that, if held by Peru's security
forces, would inhibit its ability to prosecute a counter-
Sendero campaign. This ability to appeal to several sectors
of society again indicates that the Shining Path is a flexible
group able to exploit any opening granted by the government
and society.
Finally, the thesis proposed a method for examining Peru's
vulnerability to revolution and its vulnerability to the
Shining Path in particular. Examining the various
fragmentations present in Peruvian society, the data indicate
that Peru is a highly divided society, with those divisions
encompassing class, race, geography, and language. When these
divisions are combined, as they are in society, one finds that
little bonds the white, urban, Spanish-speaking Peruvian with
the Indian of the sierra who speaks Quechua, despite 400 years
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of statehood and mixing. To be deemed an Indian or to be a
Quechua speaker means to be categorized and, in effect, denied
possibilities in society, this despite the fact that "pure"
Indians and "pure" Europeans are far less common now than in
the past. This in effect makes the division arbitrary, a
situation perhaps even more repugnant to the excluded, further
exposing conflictive situations to be exploited by
revolut ionaries
.
The role and impact" of Peru's economic collapse in the
1980s was examined briefly. This creates a vulnerability to
revolution, but only if the citizens see no other alternative
and if certain segments of society are bearing an unfair and
disproportionate burden. I would argue, borrowing again from
Chalmers Johnson, that economic disasters normally act as
accelerators of revolution that require other significant
dysfunctions in society to result in revolutionary activity.
Finally, the thesis analyzed the role of political
institutions in Peru's vulnerability to revolution. This
chapter's analysis found that the Peruvian State, as
demonstrated by its handling of the economy and the
insurgency, is not an efficacious or effective government,
giving the population little reason to support the government
through difficult circumstances. Further, the role of
political space was analyzed and its importance found to be
high. The Peruvian State does not effectively occupy its own
territory, leaving it open for other political actors to
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create their own political reality. Thus the State, by
neglecting its proper role Ln political socialization and
legitimate presence in its own land in effect cedes that
mission to someone else, particularly in a society in
transition. That role may be filled by trade or labor unions,
other interest groups, or revolutionary movements. This is
not to imply that a government should suppress avenues of
socialization other than its own. However, the government,
particularly an elected government, should have its voice
heard, if for no other reason than to provide a countervailing
or alternative message. Especially in the excluded segments
of a divided society, people want an explanation for their
situation and the world around them. In the absence of
governmental presence, that role was filled by the Shining
Path.
The presence of political space has other ramifications as
well. By not occupying its own territory, the Peruvian
government- evidently did not realize the threat posed by
Abimael Guzman and the Shining Path until the insurgency was
well established, delaying its response and giving SL valuable
time to become established, to institutionalize, and to
proselytize
.
Peru's vulnerabilities to revolution are important when
questioning whether the Shining Path will be able to overcome
the loss of Guzman. If Peru does not act to mitigate the
divides in society, the economic hardship that engulfs much of
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its population, and the political space in the countryside, it
leaves SL's ability to regenerate much easier.
The government has two venues within which to combat the
Shining Path. One is in the military and police realm,
whereby the regime'.- coercive elements either react
defensively or act offensively against the movement. As was
described earlier, Guzman's capture has thus far been a
singular event, not followed by further aggressive action.
Secondly, the coercive arms have not demonstrated any
additional capability outside Lima. Thus, the government has
not demonstrated the capacity to defeat Sendero solely in the
military theater.
The other venue within which the government can combat SL
is in the social, economic, and political realm. By
addressing the conditions which allowed the Shining Path to
rise and spread, the government takes away the conflictive
issues which Sendero has exploited in the past. By addressing
the societal divides, the government removes one of Sendero 's
key conflictive issues. By establishing itself in the
countryside as a legitimate governor, the State can present
itself as a alternative to the many communities not attracted
to the Shining Path method and message yet also distrustful of
the government. Finally, by establishing itself throughout
the country and acting as a legitimate sovereign, the State
creates for itself an alternative source of intelligence with
which it can prosecute the armed realm of the conflict. Thus
ii::
far, other than in the economic arena, the government has not
demonstrated a desire to tackle the factors that allowed the
Shining Path to emerge.
In conclusion, given Sendero's demonstrated capacity to
adapt to changing conditions, this thesis argues that the
capture of Guzman presents the government with a short-term
opportunity. The government can use that time to attack the
organization militarily and by robbing it of its issues and
cause. By alleviating the roots of the movement, the
government can knock the foundation out from under the
organization, decreasing the threat posed to the State itself.
Until this is done, Peru will be a revolution waiting to
happen, be it by Sendero or others.
Judging by the evidence presented in this thesis, Sendero
is not dead. It has demonstrated a large degree of
flexibility, a condition that allowed it to build its strength
over the years and is now a precondition for its survival.
Further, the government has not demonstrated the willingness
to deprive Sendero of its bases of support by addressing the
social tensions and contradictions in society highlighted
above. Thus the Shining Path's ability to regenerate itself
will be less difficult. Given the organization's ability to
adapt and the government's apparent unwillingness or inability
to address the conditions that support the movement, one
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